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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We may mean very different things when we say that an actor (the 
putative defendant in a lawsuit designed to alter the behavior in which he 
would engage but-for legal intervention) “discriminates” against another 
person (the suit’s putative plaintiff).  Recognizing this difference is 
helpful because it demonstrates that we should be extremely clear in 
using a term that does not have a single, uncontested meaning.  More 
importantly, it reveals why we have certain norms against private 
discrimination, particularly in the employment market and a subset of 
markets in which customers purchase goods and services.1  Thus, we 
 *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Stanford Law 
School. 
 1. One could derive a descriptive or normative theory of the legally cognizable 
“wrongs” of discrimination by asking whether customers are harmed more or differently 
if not sold on equal terms the subset of goods or services covered by most 
antidiscrimination statutes (for example, service at “public accommodations,” housing, 
loans) than they are harmed by the failure to sell goods and services in legally 
unregulated markets (for example, sales of cars, most retail commodities).  Such a theory 




must examine how the plaintiff’s interests are compromised by each 
form of discrimination.  We must also see how the defendant’s interests 
are compromised if he cannot engage in a particular sort of discrimination 
in a particular setting.  Part III discusses four broad “definitions” of 
discrimination.  The first is that discriminating simply involves making 
distinctions among persons.  In this view, the putative defendant discriminates 
unless he allocates the “good” that the putative plaintiff seeks without 
regard to any of the plaintiff’s discernible traits.  The defendant could do 
this either by granting the desired good to all who seek it or, if it is 
scarce, allocating it on a lottery basis.  The second definition is that a 
defendant discriminates if the defendant allocates goods because of the 
status of the person seeking the good.  Third, one can say that a person 
discriminates when he does not allocate a good to a person seeking the 
good, even though the person has met the legitimate set of criteria for 
receiving the good.2  The fourth definition is that a person discriminates 
not only when he rejects a person with the same market-relevant traits as 
one he accepts, but also when he refuses to reasonably accommodate a 
person seeking inclusion.  This is especially the case if nonaccommodation 
segregates “social groups” or significantly increases the chances of creating 
subordinated castes.  In Part III, I elucidate these categories.  At the same 
time, I demonstrate how difficult defining and confining each distinct 
discrimination type is and also explain why it is unlikely that the legal 
regime could settle upon any single definition of discrimination. 
However, before doing that, Part II runs through briefly, but does not 
defend, a loose utilitarian framework for assigning entitlements.  This 
section aims to provide a meaningful framework to ask the questions 
asked in Part III.3  In this framework, the critical questions concern the 
(broadly) “hedonic” (negative) consequences that putative plaintiffs 
will face if exposed to distinct forms of unregulated discrimination.  
Additionally, the framework addresses the consequences that putative 
defendants and those affected by a regime that regulates those in the 
defendant’s position will face if regulated.  My view of this loosely 
would likely center on real or imagined distinctions in the degree to which access to 
public accommodations or housing was more vital to “membership in the community” 
than access to a broad range of commodities.  I suspect, though, that the particular 
coverage limits reflect nothing more than the perceived need to respond to what were 
seen as the actual, historically contingent instantiations of Southern race prejudice at the 
time the antidiscrimination political movements first flourished. 
 2. One might further say that only a subset of putative plaintiffs victimized by the 
failure to receive goods they are “qualified” to receive can legitimately vindicate claims 
against this form of discrimination. 
 3. That is, attempting to define distinct forms of discrimination, to identify the 
distinct interests that distinct sorts of discrimination compromise, and to a lesser extent, 
to evaluate the strength of claims against prohibiting these distinct forms of 
discrimination that would be made by distinct putative defendants in distinct settings. 
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utilitarian exercise is admittedly peculiar and idiosyncratic.  Most importantly, 
I discount the standard welfarist claim that there are coherent ways of 
simply observing how a subject evaluates her own life, by her own 
lights, without regard to our “weak perfectionist” ideas about what is the 
proper way to evaluate one’s own experience.4  I also disclaim views which 
strike me as indefensibly rigid and narrow.5  In this regard, I reject the 
idea that the antidiscrimination norm’s propriety should be evaluated 
solely by reference to its impact on a mere subset of experiences or 
capacities to engage in certain activities, for example, a claim that what 
is relevant in deciding whether the plaintiff merits protection is the 
plaintiff’s legitimate sense that, absent protection, he is not treated as a 
“first-class” citizen.6  At the same time, I hope that in briefly elucidating 
a loosely utilitarian framework, we can more readily see why some of 
the canonical critiques of adopting utilitarianism as an across-the-board, 
ethical decisionmaking system (particularly its unduly stringent demand 
for agent-neutral rather than agent-relative behavior) will help us better 
comprehend some of the reasons we ought to limit the reach of one or 
another version of the antidiscrimination principle. 
II. A LOOSELY UTILITARIAN NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
There are a host of questions—certainly bigger questions than I can 
address here—about how to think about establishing valid legal claims.  
Doubtless, it is possible to believe that one ought to establish an 
entitlement framework by considering what rights would be agreed to by 
contractors with suitably restricted aims or information about their 
particular situations.  Alternatively, we might look to justify an entitlement 
scheme using only some acceptable set of arguments.7  It is also possible 
 4. For a fuller exposition of my views in this regard, see Mark Kelman, Hedonic 
Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391 (2005). 
 5. I disclaim those views whether they are framed as overtly perfectionist, 
autonomy-oriented, or deriving from views that there are particular, restricted domains in 
which the state rightly cares about its citizens’ experience. 
 6. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-
Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1998).  Rosenblum argues that certain forms of discrimination by private associations are 
permissible not only because of the discriminator’s strong interests, but because such 
discrimination does not implicate the putative plaintiffs’ sole legitimate interest, their 
interest in “first class citizenship.”  See id. 
 7. For instance, one might believe that only some entitlement frameworks are 
consistent with the injunction that we treat each subject’s interests as equally valid and 
do not rely on adopting any particular conception of the good life. 




that one best establishes an entitlement framework by deriving what one 
believes are the concrete rights that follow inexorably from respecting 
some acceptable limiting principles,8 or deriving them from more 
affirmative injunctions.9  I am incredibly dubious about all such efforts, 
but for now, my skepticism is neither here nor there. 
It is also possible to believe that one can and should follow a 
deceptively simple consequentialist decision rule in establishing an 
entitlements framework.  Such a rule would state that society prohibits 
conduct when the aggregated hedonic consequences of permitting the 
conduct are negative.10  In the simplest cases—and it is unlikely any 
cases are so simple given the possibility of widespread “rule-utilitarian” 
consequences to forbidding or permitting any particular instance of 
conduct—we simply ban conduct when its negative impact on the person 
seeking prohibition exceeds the affirmative impact on the person who 
wishes to engage in the conduct.11
 8. Perhaps, for example, the separateness of persons, a rule against expropriating 
from X to benefit Y, or a rule of self-ownership. 
 9. For example, to maximize each person’s capacity to realize so much of her 
autonomous will as is consistent with valid expressions of autonomy by those around her. 
 10. The (loose) utilitarian evaluations of alternative discrimination forms are 
meant to be made quite cautiously.  It is worth cataloguing possible “harms” and 
“benefits” associated with distinct forms of behavior that we choose to restrict or permit 
without forgetting the myriad ways in which these are, at best, suggestive lists. 
 11. In this analysis, I simply duck a fundamentally administrative question, often 
mislabeled a question about the proper nature of obligations, of whether we should ever 
prospectively regulate activity that risks hedonic loss or regulate only the subset of 
persons who cause loss.  Whatever serious problems quasi-utilitarian frameworks have, 
it is not a good answer to those who think that our goal in assigning entitlements is to 
insure that people do not cause (net) harm to say that we characterize conduct as 
wrongful even when it turns out to be harmless.  In other words, we are not banning 
behavior without regard to its harmfulness when we ban either risk-taking or attempts. 
I am dubious that we can identify with certainty any class of cases in which we are 
strongly predisposed to ban behavior though we are certain that no one will be 
hedonically or experientially harmed by the behavior, even at the moment when the actor 
engages in the behavior, before the behavior’s actual consequences have been revealed.  
Take one of the canonical supposed counterexamples: Government agents may breach a 
“right to privacy” if they find out what Web sites you visit even if you will never learn 
they are doing so, and thus cannot be hedonically harmed by their conduct.  I am 
skeptical that our intuition that the conduct is wrongful, in any case, was formed in a 
world in which we could really comprehend that there was absolutely no way of 
becoming aware that we were being snooped on.  This is true in the contingent empirical 
sense that experience tells us that the existence of some such spying will leak, just as 
some subset of another group who bear rights though rights-violation is hedonically 
empty, unconscious rape victims, will learn that they have been violated.  It is also true, 
less contingently, that each of us would actually know that there is some expected level 
of spying—each of us would feel there is some chance that we are being spied on, would 
have the experience that it is possible that we are being embarrassed—so long as such 
spying were permitted, even if we knew for sure that we would never be certain.  It 
would be quite odd to say that one is psychologically injured if one knows that someone 
is watching you undress at the department store, but uninjured if one thinks there is, say, 
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But assuming one follows such a simple decision rule, a number of 
obvious questions follow.  What will the putative plaintiff P experience 
if discriminated against in the relevant way?  Will others not directly 
discriminated against also suffer aversive experiences?  What sorts of 
aversive experiences will they suffer, and do the distinctions in the forms 
of the aversive experiences help us judge the likely intensity of the 
negative experience, its likely impact on future experience, and the 
possibility that it is averted at lower “cost” by the “victim” than the 
perpetrator? 
At the same time, we must look at what the defendants and those 
affected by the defendants’ decisions will lose if they cannot make a 
certain type of discriminatory decision.  Presumably, of course, defendants 
lose different things depending on the sort of discriminatory decision 
they would prefer to make if allowed to do so.  In all cases, we make 
assumptions about the distribution of likely hedonic reactions to an end-
state, knowing that there could always be outliers.  For instance, we 
might intuit that people will be bothered less if “forced to deal” over the 
Internet with order processors from a disfavored religious group than 
they would be if they could not reject one who sought to give a speech 
about her beliefs at the front door.  We say so, though, knowing that 
a 99.9% chance that someone is, but would never be certain.  If 99.9%, why not 0.9%?  
In either case, you readily picture the bad event, and it is the capacity to envision the true 
event that causes the relevant sense of disquiet. 
At the same time, I am dubious that we ban or permit conduct whenever we strongly 
suspect that the net effects are hedonically negative or positive.  Thus, for instance, I am 
skeptical that the canonical rule-utilitarian defenses of permitting certain agent-relative 
breaches of simple act-utilitarian decisionmaking really do much work.  Rule-utilitarians 
may argue that parents may save their drowning kid rather than two nearby strangers 
because if we forbade them to do that, by rule, parents generally would not develop the 
sorts of deep ties to their kids that utilitarians should cherish (or because such a rule 
would be so burdensome to follow that insisting on it would merely encourage a utility-
eroding breakdown of general legal authority).  But I think these sorts of rule-utilitarian 
just-so stories are not doing much real work.  I would also be skeptical of playing with 
the direct “welfare” numbers and saying that the loss to parents of having failed to save 
their own kid would outweigh the abstract loss of multiple lives.  I return in the text, in 
discussing the domain of antidiscrimination law, to the question of whether there are 
more plausible rule-utilitarian arguments that suggest that we should restrict the situations in 
which we demand that people take utility-maximizing action.  And I note only for now 
that this question is distinct from the question of whether each person is duty-bound to 
be a utilitarian in each of his life decisions.  One can plainly believe that utilitarianism is 
solely a theory of how to make judgments about public governance.  This historical 
reading of early utilitarian writers as interested in rules for public legislation, not private 
ethics, is emphasized in Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and 
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118-19 (2000). 




there could be someone who is not only fervent about not doing business 
with someone in the hated group, but more fervent in her reactions to 
giving money than having any personal contact.  In the face-to-face 
reaction, she might, for instance, feel she can show her distaste.  It is 
hard to know whether (loose) utilitarians are indifferent to the outliers 
because it is administratively too costly to tailor legal practices to 
account for them, because they despair that people will develop these 
abnormal and undesirably cost-imposing tastes if they gain exemptions 
from ordinary obligations, or because they launder preferences and treat 
some atypical preferences as illegitimate.  In any case, these are not my 
main concerns.12
It is worth noting that the (loose) utilitarian’s jumbled use of these 
three moves renders lots of (loose) utilitarian arguments difficult to 
distinguish from arguments assigning entitlements without regard to 
hedonic consequences, but rather on the basis of some deontological 
rights-granting principles.13  Think about the following problem in 
distinguishing discrimination-as-differentiation from discrimination-as-
aversion to those of a particular status.  Imagine that despite meeting all 
stated conventional economic productivity criteria, one class of putative 
plaintiffs does not receive a job because of the employer’s aversive 
racism.  Another class is rejected because they are incapable of “doing 
 12. Similarly, it is not my main concern that I do not think the concepts of 
“aversive” and “positive” experiences provides any truly tractable measure to do 
something like scientific policymaking.  The problems are both practical and, more 
powerfully, conceptual: at the practical level, constructing cardinal social welfare 
measures from incomplete ordinal rankings of end-states by individuals is not really 
feasible.  More conceptually, none of the “surrogates” for “welfare” are satisfactory.  
Conventional Benthamite utilitarianism (extolling pleasure and pain-avoidance) takes 
inadequate account of the diversity of tastes and preference utilitarianism cannot 
overcome the problem that we cannot ascertain the domain of respectable preferences 
(those that are adequately prudent and informed) without solving the problem that 
preference utilitarianism is designed to avoid: having a prior theory of what welfare is.  
Unless a person knows the “true” hedonic consequences of her decisions, she is 
inadequately informed and unless she chooses in a way that advances her hedonic ends, 
she is imprudent.  But how do we know what the hedonic consequences of a decision are 
unless we know what welfare is?  It is certainly not practically feasible (and arguably 
conceptually troublesome as well) to tell a subject all consequences of her decision and 
let her figure out herself which ones count as dysphoric and as pleasurable in the ways 
that are relevant to her.  At core, we are well off in a host of quite distinct ways, and 
policy observers can elicit views of how life is going from a wide array of perspectives: 
the choice to emphasize one or other perspective is at core the policymakers’ choice, not 
the view of the subject.  For a fuller discussion, see Kelman, supra note 4. 
 13. See generally Barbara Fried & Mark Kelman, The Pragmatic Consequences of 
Foundational Principles (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that welfarist arguments 
blur into deontological arguments, just as deontological arguments gain content from the 
surreptitious invocation of welfarist ones, so there is little at stake in making distinct 
“foundational” commitments, especially in relation to issues thought of as involving 
“distributive justice”). 
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the job,” as defined in a fashion that even the rejected applicants find 
legitimate.  It is not obvious, a priori, that the particular hedonic losses 
associated with feeling victimized by racism are worse than those 
associated with learning of one’s actual inadequacy along dimensions 
that one thinks are perfectly legitimate bases for judgment.14
Ignoring, for now, more direct utilitarian arguments that the rejected 
plaintiff’s pain is more likely to be outweighed in the case in which the 
plaintiffs are “unqualified” because defendants will lose more if ordered 
to hire the unqualified than if directed to hire those towards whom they 
feel racist aversion, most utilitarians would use one or the other 
technique to question how weighty the plaintiffs’ interest is in avoiding 
feeling awful when “legitimately rejected.”  The loose utilitarian argument 
may take a direct preference-laundering form (it is simply no better to 
feel slighted than it is to feel sadistic pleasures or envy, unless one is 
slighted for “bad reasons”).15  It may take a moral hazard form (if people 
get protected from “just” refusals to hire certain persons only if they feel 
bad enough about them, they will develop the bad feelings though there 
is no gain to do so and we should discourage forming emotional reactions 
that threaten to reduce other actors’ freedom to engage in highly utility-
enhancing activity).  It may take an administrative form (unlike negative 
reactions to aversive racism, feelings about “merited” rejection are too 
diverse to use a general rule).  I suspect, in fact, we would see all such 
forms of manipulation.16
 14. Think of the classic warnings sounded in MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE 
MERITOCRACY 114 (Transaction Publishers 1994) (1958) (noting that a true meritocracy 
might be insufferable for those who did not “measure up”). 
 15. To the extent that utilitarian theorists engage in preference-laundering, the 
distinction between the purportedly opposed deontological and consequentialist 
traditions blurs considerably.  The distinction between arguing that one’s claims depend 
on having “legitimate” interests rather than on having “entitlements” or “rights” is, to put 
it kindly, slender.  See Fried & Kelman, supra note 13. 
 16. Naturally, this is also true on the defendant’s side.  When I casually state that 
aversive racists will not lose much hedonically if asked to hire those towards whom they 
are aversive, I am burying, through some combination of preference-laundering and 
moral hazard fears, the possibility that their hedonic losses are indeed severe. 
Think about the distinction between accommodation and standard disparate 
treatment: even those commentators, like Bagenstos and Stein, who claim that they 
believe that the distinctions between conventional discrimination and nonaccommodation are 
normatively nonexistent and descriptively thin argue that what is wrongful is the failure 
to engage in “reasonable accommodation.”  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational 
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 825, 836-37 (2003); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 645-49 (2004).  But there is 




III. DEFINING DISCRIMINATION 
By exploring four of the ways that a person might be said to 
discriminate against others, as well as the difficulties of defining each 
purportedly distinct conception of discrimination, we can elucidate more 
about what sorts of harms those burdened by discrimination might 
complain of and how parties resisting regulation of their choices would 
argue that regulation worsens their lots. 
1.  A person may discriminate in allocating a (broadly defined) 
good if he attends to distinctions between persons seeking the 
good.  Unless he makes the good available to all or allocates a 
good for which demand exceeds supply by a form of lottery in 
which the chances of “winning” are in no way trait-dependent, 
he “discriminates.”17
In intimate relationships, each of us obviously discriminates in this 
way.  For instance, by choosing dinner guests, we explicitly or implicitly 
no such reasonableness limit on the conventional disparate treatment law’s reach that 
either commentator seems to favor.  It is not a defense to the requirement to serve 
African-Americans at a lunch counter that one really, really, really hates to do it, in the 
same way that it is a defense to the requirement to accommodate a disabled patron that it 
is too costly to do so.  Nor do Stein or Bagenstos propose that it ought to be a defense to 
racist exclusion despite their ostensible commitment to obliterating the normative 
distinction between accommodation and “antidiscrimination.”  One could put this distinction 
in terms of the line between “rights” and “policy-balancing interests” but I never had any 
stake in this formulation because I actually do not believe in the possibility of drawing 
stable distinctions between deontological rights thinking and welfarism.  So how do we 
defend the distinction in these more standard “cheat-on-strict-welfarism” ways?  Perhaps 
we are just guessing about typical tastes and then refusing to administer a system 
sensitive to outliers, merely guessing that there are not enough public accommodation 
owners who really experience commercial association especially aversively to bear the 
costs of figuring out whether there are any.  Perhaps we are instead, or also, worried 
about moral hazard.  Finally, and most plausibly in my view, we may simply be engaged 
in standard preference-laundering. 
For those, like Stein or Bagenstos, who want to disclaim the preference-laundering 
interpretation, see, for example, Bagenstos, supra, at 885-89, because it implies a moral 
distinction between nonaccommodators and discriminators, it might be necessary to 
argue that the restriction of the antidiscrimination norm to “public” life does permit a 
“reasonableness” limitation for “pure” discriminators, but that it does so at the “wholesale” 
rather than “retail” (case-by-case) level.  That is to say, that we permit people to 
discriminate in their choice of mates reflects the fact that we know they get lots of utility 
out of these sorts of discriminatory decisions but we despair about fact-finding in cases in 
which they act on the “distaste” for association in, say, public accommodations.  In this 
sense, the argument against allowing “reasonable” pure market discrimination is not so 
much a preference-laundering argument as an administrative costs argument.  I am sure 
the argument that it is nothing but administrative costs could be logically made; I just 
doubt it could be made sincerely. 
 17. We ordinarily associate this “meaning” of the term discriminate with phrases 
like “a discriminating palate” that carry no immediate pejorative connotation. 
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reject people who seek a good (the chance to have dinner with us) 
because of the different, individual traits we discern they have.  Similarly, 
we do so just as obviously in “commercial life”; one is unlikely to get 
the head surgery job with only a law degree and unlikely to get service at 
the lunch counter unless one has a demonstrable willingness and ability 
to pay. 
Those who do not get goods they seek plainly experience some hedonic 
loss simply because they do not get something they want.  Remembering 
this is important, because even when we think about conventionally 
legally problematic discrimination (refusals to deal because of racial 
animus, for instance), we must recall that one of the putative plaintiff’s 
objections to discrimination is that it deprives him of something he 
wants.  At the same time, if the good being allocated is inexorably scarce, 
then picking out some people to get what they want causes no incremental 
increase in hedonic loss on this account alone.  Selectivity will affect the 
identity of those with frustrated desires, but not the quantity of frustrated 
desire.18  For example, if one hundred people want X and only twenty-
five can get it, seventy-five will be disappointed whether those who get 
X win a lottery or appeal more to X’s purveyor.  So, being subject to this 
sort of discrimination causes hedonic loss to the class of potential goods 
claimants, compared to being free from it, only if the putative defendants 
selectively choose to ration a good that need not be rationed, or if the 
experience of being rejected causes hedonic harm distinct from, and 
greater than, the experience of merely holding a losing lottery ticket. 
The fact that we do care about “mere” frustrated desire—and care 
enough to prohibit imposing it in situations in which the putative defendants’ 
interests in making choices for reasons are especially weak—is readily 
seen when reflecting upon common carrier obligations.  Obviously, it is 
possible to describe the form of discrimination in which a common 
carrier may not engage according to our third definition of discrimination, 
that is, failure to supply a good for which the putative plaintiff meets all 
legitimate qualifications.19  But what seemingly drives the requirement 
that a common carrier offer service to all well-behaved, paying comers is 
not that putative rejected plaintiffs will feel some special psychological 
loss because their objective qualifications are ignored.  Rather, it is the 
sense that the rejected plaintiffs may not get a service that they desire.  
 18. Of course, this is true unless the basis of selection is intensity of preference. 
 19. Surely the common carrier is allowed to engage in some differentiation, for 
example, on the basis of ability to pay for the services. 




That there were no ready substitutes for those with common carrier 
obligations increased the chance of frustrated desire, and thus distinguished 
common carriers from ordinary shopkeepers with the legal privilege to 
refuse service for any reason.  The existence of a monopoly-like power 
did not increase the inherent psychological wound in being rejected 
despite having relevant qualifications.20
Obviously, though, defendants in many situations have strong and 
legitimate interests in making trait-based decisions.21  In fact it is hard to 
imagine, in the absence of scarcity, why we would observe the markets 
that antidiscrimination law typically regulates.  Ergo, in the traditional 
domains in which antidiscrimination law has held sway, we will surely 
not supplant discrimination with a demand for universal access.22
Lotteries may protect putative plaintiffs against much stigmatic rejection23 
and may prevent certain people from bearing repeated, concentrated loss of 
 20. Thus, to the degree that antidiscrimination norms are meant to protect plaintiff 
access to wanted goods, the answer to whether subordinated but not hierarchically 
dominant groups should be protected is grounded entirely in how we answer a wholly 
empirical inquiry.  If owners can discriminate, blacks will not get lunch counter service 
anywhere (or find it difficult or costly to get) because white racism is systemic and 
whites own most lunch counters, while a white rejected by a lunch counter owner, either 
because of anti-white racism or more idiosyncratic distaste for the particular customer, is 
likely to be able to get a lunch readily from a nearby competitor.  I have raised this point 
before, in a mildly different fashion.  See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination 
and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 863-65 (2001) (arguing that members of socially 
advantaged groups are unlikely to face idiosyncratic discrimination persistently); Mark 
Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in College Athletics Entail Gender Equality?, 7 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 63, 90 (1997) (same). 
 21. That is, interests so “legitimate” that even preference-laundering utilitarians 
are liable to respect them. 
 22. Of course, though, many public accommodation owners could in fact serve all 
paying customers: a common carrier obligation comes closer in some ways to requiring 
universal access than a lottery could. 
 23. Violations of all versions of the antidiscrimination norm, with the exception of 
the version that identifies discrimination with any form of individuated differentiation, 
bear what is thought of as some sort of special injury associated with feeling one’s been 
subjected to unjust treatment.  The theories of injustice, though associated with distinct 
theories of discrimination, may differ modestly.  However, broadly speaking, each 
identifies injustice with the failure to recognize a relevant sort of merit (the theories of 
merit differ some between the third and fourth, or accommodationist, theory of 
discrimination), while the second (conventional disparate treatment) theory assumes that 
the injury is intensified when the reason for the failure to recognize merit is status.  This 
is so because status is inescapable (which increases the sense of injustice) and because 
people identify with their status positions and thus feel a special wound from 
mistreatment that grows from undervaluation of the group that they would not feel from 
individual trait undervaluation.  In any case, the third and fourth theories largely ignore 
the special injuries inherent in being treated badly for a bad reason.  The costliness of 
recognizing virtue (and the associated inevitable accidental mistakes) may be of little 
moment under theory three (at least when groups are adversely impacted, and so affected 
persistently) and the rationality of nonaccommodation is of little moment under theory 
four. 
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access to desirable social goods which, given the declining marginal 
utility of goods, might reduce social welfare.  Requiring lotteries seems more 
feasible than demanding universal access.  However, if all who seek the 
goods are entered without regard to productivity as workers or willingness 
and capacity to pay as customers, they are still unlikely to be mandated 
in the commercial domain.  This is so because requiring them implicitly 
establishes a (generally rejected) strong duty to share material goods.24
Oddly, we are more likely to see lotteries demanded in a subset of 
private settings “more intimate” than the market.  This is so even though 
we typically increasingly protect the defendants’ freedom of action as 
we move from state to market to intimate spheres.  However, we might 
think it quite legitimate to ban selective fraternities or sororities (that is, 
to “force” students to associate with housemates not of their own 
choosing) both because of the stigmatic losses associated with “reasoned” 
rejection and because we think social welfare will generally increase by 
randomly distributing college housing.25  If “spontaneous” patterns of 
living arrangements generate a set of cognizable harms—snootiness, 
lack of empathy, narrowness of tastes—then the lottery distribution may 
be better than the distribution generated by allowing people to act on 
reasons.  These gains, parallel to those sometimes attributed to racial 
integration, might be best obtained by forms of mandatory social mixing 
that will only occur through mandatory lotteries.26  The correlative losses 
 24. One would likely justify demands for universal access using conventional 
distributive justice and equality arguments, not arguments based on anything special 
about the fact that those poorer citizens faced discrimination from these particular 
providers who initially possessed goods that the poor sought.  This distinction between 
justification modes may be overstated, though: think about Bernard Williams’ canonical 
(if reasonably criticized) argument that attempted to justify a high degree of equality of 
access to medical care by focusing on whether doctors engaged in one form of 
impermissible discrimination—distributing their medical services on the basis of 
something other than the appropriate reason (need for care)—rather than on the basis of a 
more general egalitarian argument sounding in utility, or ontological claims to capacity, 
or equal respect.  See Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, 
AND SOCIETY 110, 120-23 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds., 2d s. 1962). 
 25. Thus, the more routine supposition that we will merely redistribute identical 
welfare losses from one party to another if the supply of a desired good remains constant 
(as the supply of the “most desirable” housing will remain constant) may not be true. 
 26. The racial integration analogy is deliberate.  One reason to ban decisions based 
on racial animus is that permitting such decisions may well generate segregation; a 
(loose) welfarist must account for the gains to integration.  Naturally, too, one of the 
chief reasons we may demand accommodation is that it generates a level of integration 
of persons with distinct experience-based perspectives that would not otherwise exist.  
Figuring out in detail when integration is “beneficial” and why is no easy matter.  Do we 




(for example, fewer or impaired intimate relationships; difficulty in 
using social groups to develop one’s own sense of identity) are also 
obvious, and not worth belaboring. 
The most conventional view of the antidiscrimination norm forbids the 
putative defendant from making decisions for a particular set of reasons, 
but neither forbids selectivity as such nor establishes a set of exclusive, 
legitimate grounds for differentiation. 
2.  A person discriminates when he withholds a (broadly defined) 
good the putative plaintiff desires because of the plaintiff’s 
protected status (most obviously race, gender, disability status, 
national origin, religion, and sexual orientation, though any list of 
potentially protected statuses is socially contingent and unlikely to 
be exhaustive). 
In ways I will return to, I find this formulation is at once impossibly 
ambiguous and so manifestly over and underinclusive that, despite its 
canonical status as the definition of discrimination, I am dubious that 
anyone can take seriously the notion that it can serve as an exclusive 
working definition.  It is a definition that worked reasonably well in 
response to the particular form of discrimination most salient for those in 
care if there are white kids (displacing Asians with higher scores) in the San Francisco 
public schools?  A mix of many racial and ethnic groups in public housing projects that 
will still have no whites at all?  Do we care that whites go to public schools because they 
will provide an otherwise-unheard voice, or is “white voice” in America so numbingly 
inescapable that students of color at a particular school do not need it embodied in their 
classmates?  Do we care instead that white kids go to public schools because “green 
follows white” (that is, the schools will be under-funded unless white voters have a more 
direct stake in school quality)?  Is integration a positive good because multicultural 
blending is invariably a virtue, or is segregation merely contingently bad because all 
existing forms of segregation entail not mutually respectful voluntary separation, but 
hierarchical domination by a group that enforces norms of interaction and separation so 
as to solidify its dominance and communicate negative messages about subordinated 
groups?  “Segregated” systems, after all, often permit and encourage a good deal of 
“social mixing” as long as one group is in a plainly subordinate position when the groups 
are in social contact.  This familiar point is emphasized and neatly elucidated in Richard 
H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and 
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). 
To the extent that we worry about segregation only as a form of subordination, we can 
readily imagine a school permitting black-only but not white-only fraternities.  For some 
reflections on these issues, focusing especially on the question of whether integrating 
distinct groups comprised of “people of color” makes sense in distinct contexts, see for 
example Selena Dong, Note, “Too Many Asians”: The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination 
Against Asian-Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 
(1995) (discussing challenges to policies that reserved spaces for white pupils in 
selective public high schools); Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal 
Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059 
(1995) (noting the inherent problems in applying equal treatment to groups with 
intergroup conflicts). 
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the political movements establishing legal regimes countering public27 
and private practices that restricted African-Americans’ access to public 
accommodations and jobs.28  This form of discrimination was the simplest 
sort of refusal to deal based solely on membership in the group: all the 
discriminator did was classify a good-seeker as a member of the status 
group and exclude him accordingly.  Such discriminators plainly, and often 
unabashedly, made their decisions because of race, just as VMI plainly 
made its decision to reject female cadets because of gender.29
This is a definition of discrimination that would likely not have 
emerged as even a plausible first approximation had the first politically 
successful movement resisting subordination, stigma, and exclusion 
been comprised of those seeking an end to discrimination against 
homosexuals.  Much of the discrimination associated with homophobia 
entwines reactions to pure “group-wide” ascribed status (“is that a person 
who has sex with someone of his or her same gender?”) and intragroup 
differentiated behavior (“is he too ‘effeminate’?” or “she too ‘butch’?”).  
For reasons I return to, characterizing the rejection of a subset of gay 
men as either unambiguously forbidden by a norm deriding decisions 
made because of sexual orientation or unambiguously acceptable given 
the norm’s limit seems quite problematic. 
Before dealing with the definition’s ambiguities, though, recall that 
actors both in intimate situations and more conventionally commercial 
ones discriminate in ways plainly comprehended by this discrimination 
definition.  For example, people choose to date or marry only those of a 
certain religion or race.  They might reject someone out of hand, for 
instance, if he is non-Catholic or white.  People also refuse to serve or 
hire people of a certain race or gender.  Whether we protect certain 
 27. For example, Jim Crow laws were existing public practices of discrimination. 
 28. Patterned categorical status-based discrimination causes pretty much the whole 
laundry list of problems for putative plaintiffs and those within the status-group not 
directly discriminated against.  It precludes people from getting a desired good, it 
precludes them from getting goods even when they feel they merit them (which makes 
the failure to get the desired good even more vexing), it communicates derogatory 
attitudes towards the group and in so doing impairs the group members’ sense of self-
worth, it helps establish castes (interfering with both the functioning of political 
democracy and the realization of social equality), it puts people in the position of being 
unable to escape certain life limits no matter what efforts they make (and provides strong 
disincentives to acquiring generally socially valued traits since possessing them will do 
people no good), and it creates significant segregation (and thereby decreases possibilities of 
pluralist or multiculturalist sharing of information and culture). 
 29. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). 




forms of intimate discrimination like the former entirely because of the 
discriminator’s strong interests in making these associational decisions 
or whether the putative plaintiffs’ losses are interestingly distinct and 
“lower” when they face “intimate” rejections is a question to which I 
will return.30  In the most conventional analyses of the difficult “border” 
cases between the intimate and commercial sphere,31 commentators 
generally assess both the putative plaintiffs’ losses if not guaranteed 
access and the defendants’ losses if association is compelled.32
As mentioned, I am quite skeptical that the canonical account of 
unacceptable race or gender discrimination—that it proscribes decisions 
made “because of” race, gender or sexual orientation—is interpretable 
or, to the degree it is interpretable, normatively compelling.  The most 
critical ambiguity is the problem of subclasses, or of “trait discrimination” 
(the putative defendant refuses to hire or serve some, but not all, African-
Americans, women, or homosexuals).  I will elucidate this problem by 
referring to several stylized examples: to wit, an employer who willingly 
hires African-Americans but refuses to hire a subset of African-
 30. By lower, I mean that the putative plaintiff’s losses are lower in either some 
sort of unalloyed hedonic sense or given some sort of preference-laundering. 
 31. Examples of these border cases include memberships in clubs where business 
contacts are made, owner-occupied rental units, and generic, secular jobs done at the 
headquarters of organizations with strong self-defined ideologies that call for making 
status-based distinctions in roles. 
 32. Here is the standard exemplar: Female plaintiff sues (almost surely 
unsuccessfully) the Catholic Church because she was turned down for a job as priest 
because of gender.  One could imagine rejecting her claim based solely on the free 
exercise and anti-entwinement interests vested in the Church, thought to be so strong (in 
consequentialist terms) or so absolute as rights that no balancing is worth the bother.  
One could do this without reaching the question of whether the refusal to hire 
substantially interferes with the plaintiff’s individual interests in access to a “job for 
which she is qualified” or more general social interests in things like the eradication of 
sexism or nonmeritocratic hiring.  But one will also see simultaneous efforts to question 
the strength of the plaintiff’s interests (as compared to the interests that she would have 
if turned down by a law firm with a no-female-lawyers rule).  So, for instance, one might 
see an argument of the form, “One cannot really want to be a priest—so that one is not 
really frustrated in an actual desire that could genuinely be realized—of the Catholic 
Church if one is rejecting one of its canonical tenets, the incapacity of women to give the 
Sacraments, and the desire to ‘play a priest-like role’ in a nonexistent religion of one’s 
private imagination is simply not enormously powerful” or an argument of the form, 
“Members of a status group will not be profoundly disadvantaged even if they are 
prohibited from playing any role in a particular intimate or associational sphere because 
profound disadvantage comes only from exclusion from positions of general social 
power.  Not being invited to a dinner party or to lead one of the innumerable organizations in 
a pluralist culture—even if it is because of race or gender—does not deprive a particular 
person, or those who witness the decision, of truly important capacities to live a good 
life.”  My point for now is not that such arguments are good or bad (though I think they 
are generally bad makeweights), but that it is tempting to downplay plaintiff-side losses 
whenever one thinks defendant-side gains are especially great. 
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American men who he feels have a belligerent, unassimilated style;33 an 
employer who hires many women but not those he views as “aggressive” 
or “bitchy;”34 or an employer who hires “femme” but not “butch” lesbians.  
In each case, does the employer discriminate because of race or gender 
or sexual orientation?35
In the first instance, it is useful to explore whether we might 
differentiate between subgroups defined in terms of behavioral “traits” 
and those defined in terms of status “features.”36  Or, perhaps it is more 
 33. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them 
But . . .”: The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 224 
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (discussing anecdotal accounts of 
subgroup discrimination). 
 34. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An 
Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 172 (2004) (arguing that workplace 
equality requires the breakdown of the gender norm that caps the prospects of aggressive 
women). 
 35. The stylized hypotheticals permit me to avoid what is often a difficult question 
in real cases: in many situations in which we observe discrimination against a subclass, 
what we would really be seeing could best be described as “intensification” of negative 
reactions to the (still-subordinate) whole group.  Thus, it may well be the case that blacks 
with physical features most stereotypically associated with blacks face more aversive 
reactions than others classified as black.  See generally, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., 
Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-
Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006) (analyzing data suggesting that 
persons with more stereotypically “black” features are more likely to be sentenced to 
death); Keith B. Maddox & Stephanie Gray Chase, Manipulating Subcategory Salience: 
Exploring the Link Between Skin Tone and Social Perception of Blacks, 34 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 533 (2004) (discussing skin color trait as apart from other physical traits).  But 
it is not the case that those with less stereotypically “black” appearances face the same 
treatment as whites. 
It may be best to imagine that we are dealing with situations in which only the 
subgroup faces problematic treatment.  However, we must recognize not only that it will 
be difficult to observe whether we are dealing with a situation in which only the 
subgroup faces such bad treatment, but that the analytical distinction between the 
“intensification” of prejudice story and the “prejudice only against the subgroup” story is 
slippery.  If there is some prejudice against “lipstick lesbians” and lots against “butch 
lesbians,” what would it mean to say that butch lesbians face intensification of generic 
prejudice against lesbians rather than a distinct form of special subgroup prejudice?  
Only in the case in which the lipstick lesbians faced no prejudice would this line be 
really completely useful. 
 36. The line between “trait-based” and “status-based” discrimination is blurry for a 
multitude of reasons.  For a fascinating discussion of the blurriness in the context of 
discrimination against gay service members, see JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S 
GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999). 
Frequently, the discriminator uses nonbehavioral status markers as proxies for 
behavioral traits.  The proxies may be processed as fairly conscious information-cost 
economizing proxies (for example, employers may consciously use an applicant’s address, or 
perhaps his given name as a proxy for nonassimilation) or unconsciously (as skin color 




apt to place the line between traits that the discriminator (in a world in 
which status-based discrimination has become “shameful” or unacceptable)37 
would admit to38 and those that continue to violate the new social 
consensus against judgments based on irrelevant status, like prejudice 
against a subset of blacks with dark skin color.39  The primary reason to 
make this distinction is that if the subgroup is defined in terms of status, 
there is no conceptual need to reformulate the traditional categorical 
view of discrimination, rather than to recognize that we historically used 
may be a proxy for nonassimilation).  To the extent that the antidiscrimination norm is 
grounded in arguments that proxy use is especially demeaning, or that using proxies 
creates perverse disincentives to develop human capital (because those possessing the 
proxy traits will be assumed to have poor employment attributes anyway), then the 
antidiscrimination norm may be violated by the use of imperfect (even if statistically 
helpful) proxies.  This is true whether the proxy is membership in the traditional group 
(“blacks are lazy”) or a subgroup (“blacks who went to a particular set of inner city 
schools will be too belligerent to subject to a reasonable level of labor discipline”). 
 37. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61-65, 67-73, 80-85 (John F. Dovidio & 
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (discussing the fact that today’s society views overt 
racial discrimination as unacceptable). 
 38. For example, relevant traits the discriminator would admit to differentiating 
between could be obedience to authority at work or “nonbelligerence.” 
 39. There is an additional and quite serious problem in distinguishing those who 
make status-based distinctions from those who make behavior or trait-based distinctions: 
we may come to define a disability status-group around any set of traits that are socially 
valued or devalued.  Here is how I described the problem: 
   One might argue that we should define simple discrimination negatively 
rather than affirmatively.  There is no canon of rationality, no sense that a 
rational actor accounts for A, B, and C, but not X, Y, and Z.  Instead, the market 
actor can base his decision on anything but group membership (e.g., national 
origin) or traits strongly associated with group membership (e.g., accent).  
Disability law is, of course, the main challenge to the maintenance of the line 
that we can define “permissible rationality” negatively, rather than affirmatively.  
The elasticity of the concept of the “disabled” will preclude us from framing 
the negative definition in terms of either group motivation (discrimination 
based on status) or impact (discrimination on the basis of a “soft” trait 
atypically correlated with status).  Virtually anyone possessing the sorts of 
widely culturally devalued traits that might give rise to the sort of persistent, 
non-idiosyncratic discrimination which the state will most typically need to 
counter through legal intervention can be deemed disabled on that account.  If 
(significant numbers of) market decisionmakers value physical attractiveness, 
those who are unattractive enough to face wage penalties are (at least arguably) 
physically disabled.  If they value certain personality traits, those with different 
traits are (at least arguably) mentally/emotionally disabled.  (Thus, if the 
employer claims to want workers who are more cheerful, he may discriminate 
against those who could be described as depressed; if he wants employees who 
are less irritating to those they interact with, he may avoid hiring narcissists, 
paranoids, and the borderline personality disordered.) 
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, supra note 20, at 873-74 (footnote 
omitted). 
The politically-contingent mutability of the “status-group” concept makes me wary of 
relying on whether people think they are engaged in socially impermissible group-based 
discrimination to ascertain some objective feature of their behavior. 
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broader categories than we should have.  That is, prejudice is not pure 
racial prejudice against blacks as we historically understood it; it is a 
mix of ethnic and racial prejudice against African-Americans rather than 
Africans, or racial prejudice against dark-skinned blacks.  Anti-lesbian 
homophobia was understood as directed against women who have sex 
with other women when it is “actually” (at least now, possibly always) 
against “butch lesbians.”40
Obviously, it is also important to ask whether the traits that form the 
basis of intensified prejudice or exclusive prejudice within the historically 
subordinated group are present only in the historically subordinated 
group or are merely disproportionately represented in the historically 
subordinated group.  However, one must concurrently recognize that there 
are severe problems in conceptualizing whether the same trait really 
exists across groups in a world in which “groups” are socially salient.41  
Thus, although socially encoded as “bitchiness” when present in females, it 
is a tough question whether female “assertiveness” really exists in males.  
By the same token, whether any non-African-American kid can dress 
“like” a black kid, even if he puts on precisely the same clothes, is also a 
tough question.  It may be more plausible to say that a white kid can 
dress like an African-American hip-hop kid than to say that a man 
wearing a dress is “behaving” precisely as a dress-wearing woman, 
rather than to say that one is “cross-dressing” and the other is not.  Still, 
it is not entirely plausible: the white kid’s form of voluntarily outgroup-
identified anti-authoritarianism signaled by dress is not precisely the 
 40. To the degree that a norm prohibiting race discrimination tolerated discrimination 
against dark-skinned blacks because dark skin does not equal “race,” and because the 
discriminator was perfectly tolerant of a subgroup of lighter-skinned blacks, the norm 
seems patently underinclusive under most plausible factual scenarios.  But thinking 
about situations in which it would not seem underinclusive is, of course, a good way of 
sharpening our sense of what makes discrimination wrongful: to the degree that some 
particular putative defendant’s prejudices against those with dark skin were completely 
idiosyncratic—akin to a distaste for those with cowlicks or hair parted in the middle—we 
might think it tolerable.  The putative plaintiff would not even be deprived of the wanted good 
(unless the provider had the sort of monopoly power that historically gave him common 
carrier obligations that would preclude any differentiation), let alone face the special 
personal harms associated with being the object of socially sanctioned discrimination (in 
terms of bolstering negative images) or helping to create social castes or undue 
segregation.  It is a contingent social fact that prejudice against those dark-skinned blacks 
would create personal stigmatic injury and social castes in much the same way that 
discrimination against the whole group of blacks would, while discrimination against 
those with parts in the middle by a particular seller or employer would be mere social 
noise in the allocation of goods, services, and jobs. 
 41. This is the key critical contribution in Yuracko, supra note 34. 




same as the African-American kid’s form of nonassimilated anti-
authoritarianism.42
Those who think it reasonable to set aside the question of whether it is 
meaningful to talk about pan-group traits generally ask two questions 
designed to revitalize the notion that we can talk about discrimination 
“because of status.”  The first question is whether the treatment of the 
“same” trait is affected by group membership.  That is, as a statistical matter, 
is there an interaction effect between trait and status?  And even if the 
trait is treated uniformly negatively,43 is the trait devalued because of its 
association with the group?  Consider a standard example in this view: 
we will find prejudice because of homosexuality even if only the 
subclass of “effeminate” gay men face prejudice, so long as “effeminate” 
straight men are treated less harshly.  Alternatively, this view holds, there is 
prejudice “because of homosexual status” even if all straight or gay 
effeminate men are treated equally badly, if the devaluation of effeminacy is 
inseparable from its association with homosexuality, especially if the 
trait is disproportionately present in gays.  I am willing to concede that 
the first inquiry may work in a subclass of cases in which the putative 
defendant cleanly identifies the devalued trait that he acted upon and the 
trait has no cultural specificity.  There is no doubt that while it might be 
acceptable to fire employees who are tardy for work, it is unacceptable 
to fire all tardy black employees but not tardy whites.  However, figuring 
out how it works when assessing more ambiguous traits less likely to 
have clear cross-group correlates is far harder: I believe that in a race-
defined and divided culture, no white job applicant can have the same 
“difficult” attitude about dealing with “white” authority that a black applicant 
can have, even if both white and black applicants could be generally 
described as sharing a “problem with authority.” 
The second inquiry is, at core, one into deep internal motivation that 
will never yield passably clear answers.  The employer who fires all 
workers who let their pants sag may or may not care more about sagging 
because it is associated with black youths, but in a world where race is 
salient, we will never really be able to rule out the possibility that his 
 42. To the degree that groups have anything resembling a set of recognizable 
cultural practices, labeling behavior without regard to its culturally-suffused meaning 
will be difficult.  So, Samoan public housing tenants in Hawaii were late with rent 
because they spend their scarce funds to give wedding gifts or attend weddings of kin.  
We can say that a non-Samoan tenant might have had the same bad excuse for nonpayment 
(going to the wedding of a second cousin), but unless we know what meaning these 
family or kin obligations have, it is hard to say that the action is the same in terms of the 
sense of obligation or “voluntariness” of the nonpayment.  For a fuller discussion, see 
Richard Lempert & Karl Monsma, Cultural Differences and Discrimination: Samoans 
Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 890 (1994). 
 43. In other words, there are no interaction effects between trait and status. 
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judgments are “infected” by racial meanings.  If he does care more, the 
discrimination against the behavioral trait is to some extent discrimination 
because of race or racial prejudice.44
Oddly, perhaps, the nature of the second problem with identifying 
discrimination with decisions made “because of” status is ambiguous.  I 
am unsure whether it is better characterized as an ambiguity problem or 
overinclusiveness problem.  In its narrow form, the problem arises when 
one thinks of the canonical ambiguous case that arises after the enactment 
of “hate crime” legislation, which proscribes assaults made “because of 
race.”  What if the assailant selects his victim because of race, but not 
because of racial animus or stereotypes?  Consider the case where race is 
merely a useful identifier.  For example, an assailant is in an accident 
with an at-fault, hit-and-run Asian driver.  The assailant sees the driver 
jump out of his car and enter a bar.  The assailant follows him in and 
slugs the only Asian in the bar.  Should one say that because he selected 
the person based solely on his racial identity, that he therefore assaulted 
the victim “because of race”? 
The case is ambiguous.  The phrase “because of race” may be meant 
to instantiate “with the motive of expressing subordinating or other negative 
attitudes towards the race” or “with the motive to harm members of that 
group” or it may be read as proscribing only a narrower, conscious goal; 
that is, when he entered the bar, he was race conscious and used race to 
select his victim.45  It is not hard to exclude the “identifier” cases from 
 44. One might still argue—as Ford does—that the norm decrying race discrimination is 
overinclusive unless it is read to forbid merely discrimination because of immutable 
race.  Because the employee can choose not to sag, the fact that he faces a bad 
consequence that he would not face but-for an attitude that would alter but-for race is 
beside the point normatively.  The strength of the plaintiff’s claim against defendant free 
action in Ford’s view is dependent upon the fundamental unavoidability of the injury.  
See Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, 
in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 38 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (criticizing 
the idea that employer rules are actionably discriminatory wherever they forbid plaintiffs 
from making choices that express their deep cultural norms). 
I disagree.  I agree that it is dubious; antidiscrimination norms ought to protect the 
preservation of “important” subcultural expressions (does sagging qualify?).  I agree to 
that the particular plaintiff may never suffer enormous injury if he can avoid injury 
entirely by making easy behavioral changes.  Still, it strikes me that blacks as a group 
will indeed be stigmatized as part of a lower caste if they come to see that whatever traits 
are indeed statistically prevalent in their community become the traits that are more 
generally socially devalued.  So I think the problem is an insoluble fact-finding problem, 
not a conceptual one. 
 45. The notion that a putative defendant’s actions are taken “because of race” 
whenever he is race-conscious resonates in the tradition that the antidiscrimination 




the domain of a norm against discrimination “because of race,” but I 
suspect that is only true because I have drawn a hypothetical which 
minimizes “group meaning.”  The case, as drawn, does not look much 
different than a case in which the assailant follows a tweed jacket-
wearing driver into the bar and picks him out as the only guy wearing a 
tweed jacket.  As posed, it would be quite odd to say that he assaulted 
him “because of his tweed jacket.”  So if we say that this decision is 
discriminatory because it was made “because of status,” then that definition 
of discrimination is plainly overinclusive. 
Ultimately, it is not fruitful to figure out what it means to make a 
decision to assault because of race, rather than to ascertain why we 
aggravate punishment for “hate crimes.”  Presumably, we are either 
attempting to identify defendants who reveal more troublesome character or 
those who cause more harm than the typical assaulter because they are 
more prone to alarm a community that justly worries about patterned 
violence when certain crimes occur.46
But what if putative defendants select people with a certain status-
marker as a method of identifying a statistically common, relevant trait?  
In this instance we must first limit ourselves to cases in which the trait is 
in fact statistically common and those in which the stereotype is false.  
We should also think of traits that are “flattering” and those that are 
demeaning.47  Thus, the car dealer offers those customers who are 
regime’s goal is to create a world (or at least a substantial zone of) race blindness, a 
world in which race is no more salient and noticeable than eye color.  I share my 
colleague Rick Banks’s sense that the world in which we live is one in which it is 
unrealistic to expect race to disappear, perceptually, so that we must construct an 
antidiscrimination regime acknowledging substantial levels of race consciousness.  See, 
e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection 
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001) (assuming that a truly colorblind 
American society is impossible). 
 46. For now, it is beside the point that I, and many others, find arguments about 
both atypical moral character and atypical harm less than overwhelmingly persuasive.  
Most assaults really do reveal one or another variety of especially loathsome character, 
and it is not easy to single out racism as the worst character marker.  Assaulters regularly 
cause different levels of “spill-over” harms to people who are not their direct victims, 
and we generally ignore distinctions in such secondary harms for a variety of reasons. 
 47. Judgments about what is flattering and what is demeaning are not readily 
made.  Say that the mugger picks out Asian victims walking in his particular 
neighborhood because he believes them to be richer and more prone to carry cash than 
others (also assume, for argument’s sake, that he is right if comparing group statistical 
norms).  Is this a flattering judgment or part of a pattern of beliefs entwined with Asian 
bashing that attributes atypical success to Asians?  Might it be demeaning because the 
belief in this form of “superiority” is so entwined with efforts at group subordination, 
rather than because the trait, looked at in the abstract, is a negative one? 
Think too about the mugger who picks out women because he believes they are less 
likely to fight back or because they are less likely to fight back successfully: I am 
skeptical that much turns on the question of whether one thinks that women’s relative 
reluctance to use violence is a virtue or vice, or whether one thinks that relative physical 
KELMAN_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 2/26/2007  10:05:35 AM 
[VOL. 43:  735, 2006] Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 755 
 
female and those who are black—customers identified solely on the 
basis of gender and race—higher prices for cars.  The dealer believes 
that both groups share a relevant trait: neither is likely to shop around for 
a bargain.  Both initial offers and the customer counteroffer prices he 
will reject are higher.48  Assume he does this to all women and all blacks 
and either (a) does it to the subset of men and non-blacks he thinks have 
the same revenue-relevant trait; or (b) that he has never discovered any 
dependable nonrace or gender-based price insensitivity signal and thus 
uses only race and gender to signal the willingness to pay higher markups. 
At this point, we must look directly at the harms those encountering 
what may or may not be called the dealer’s “discrimination” may face.  
It is simply not possible to ascertain in a vacuum whether this decision is 
made “because of race or gender” rather than “because of price 
insensitivity.”49  Certainly, the putative plaintiffs are victimized in the 
fashion that all subjected to differentiating regimes face: they do not get 
the good they desire at the best price.  They are not, though, subject to 
the sense that they are held in low regard on account of their status 
alone.  Neither do they experience the associated sense that, in this 
weakness is a neutral fact or a charged insult.  I am not even deeply convinced that much 
turns on whether the perception or reality of women’s physical weakness is entwined 
with their subjugation.  Finally, I am also not sure much turns on whether either belief is 
true or not. 
 48. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? 20-36, 46-55, 72-78, 91-100, 123-24 
(2001) (analyzing statistical data indicating that dealers do charge blacks and women more, 
rightly believing they are less likely to shop around). 
 49. One of the reasons I believe this inquiry so analytically difficult is that 
resolving it requires making wholly untenable distinctions between purportedly relevant 
purpose and purportedly irrelevant motive.  This is a big issue, and one I want to set 
aside.  I would note, though, that some would argue that it is the seller’s purpose here to 
harm women and his motive to make more money.  Like Binder, I believe that what is 
described as motive in this formulation is nothing but a more remote intention.  See 
Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5, 47 (2002) 
(discussing goals as “remote intentions”). 
This case also demonstrates the impossibility of drawing a distinction that seems 
critical to those who have argued that the conventional antidiscrimination norm requires 
cost-increasing steps so long as the decisionmaker has made a decision because of race.  
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 834, 850-52 (arguing that cleansing one’s 
decisionmaking requires “non-costless” techniques).  One simply cannot tell in these cases 
whether it is apt to describe the decisionmaker as acting because of race or not.  The relative 
acceptability of using race as an identifier of the individual who hit one’s car before one 
assaults him compared to using it as an identifier of an economic trait (price insensitivity) has 
nothing to do with the second use more transparently violating a norm against making 
decisions “because of race,” but rather, the legal conclusion that the second use is more 
likely to be dubbed to have arisen from conventional disparate treatment merely 
instantiates the conclusion that it is more bothersome in consequentialist terms. 




particular setting, people with similar status markers face persistent 
disadvantage regardless of their actual traits.  They are not subjected to 
the frustration of not getting something on the same terms though there 
is no reason, other than irrelevant ones, that they did not.  However, 
unlike the Asian assault victim in the bar, the customers are hurt not 
because of an individual action that has nothing to do with their race, but 
because they belong to a social group assumed rightly or wrongly to 
have certain traits.  Moreover, the customers are cognizant that some of 
these traits, if not unambiguously unflattering or negative, are occasions 
for social disadvantage.  And permitting the seller to think in group 
terms—even when doing so merely allows him to consider, in this case, 
neutral and true traits50—facilitates a regime in which much thinking 
about subordinated groups is derogatory and falsely stereotypical.51
At first blush, it seems we might be able to avoid thorny inquiries into 
whether a decision is made because of the putative plaintiff’s status by 
saying that the putative defendant discriminates whenever he allocates a 
job or good for an irrelevant reason.  Thus: 
3.  Discrimination can be defined as the failure to give a person a 
desired good though he has met all the valid prerequisites to 
receive the good52 or to put him on equal footing for lottery 
 50. For example, blacks are generally less able to shop around and because they 
are more often captive buyers, a trait that in no way reflects upon them negatively, they 
are likely to be willing to pay more. 
 51. We are left with some related questions: for example, is it true that the same 
dealer who recognizes that blacks are captive buyers will be more prone to think some 
subset of blacks make poor workers, or will it make other employers more likely to do so 
if “racialized” categories are acceptable in economic life?  Will the failure to intervene to 
forbid using group markers make eradicating both the statistically false and the subordinating 
generalizations more difficult, even if the particular dealer can sort out benign from 
malevolent uses of both false stereotyping and bothersome statistical discrimination? 
 52. To map this up to conventional legal categories, most disparate impact suits 
have this form.  It is possible that disparate impact doctrine was dominantly motivated 
by the desire to prove disparate treatment (treatment “because of race”) in cases in which 
there was inadequate direct evidence of race-motivated treatment.  It is also possible that 
disparate impact suits were dominantly meant to evade the thorny problem of 
characterizing employer reactions to traits associated with, but not identical to, status as 
either race-infected or neutral (we need not decide whether the employer would have had 
the same negative reaction to a certain syntactical or grammatical style but-for the race 
of those who use it if we decide instead that insisting upon “mainstream” syntax or 
grammar disproportionately harms blacks and is unrelated to performing job functions).  
But it is most plausible that the disparate impact cause of action instantiated the belief 
that the failure to receive meritocratic treatment was adequately harmful to justify legal 
remedy.  However, disparate impact law assumes we will not proscribe the nonmeritocratic 
treatment unless a group is adversely affected: even if the high school diploma is 
irrelevant to success for any employee of Duke Power and even if a single black plaintiff 
without such a diploma can demonstrate that the diploma is irrelevant to success, we will 
not ban its use if blacks and whites are burdened proportionately.  So we may believe 
that we need to end practices that create needless social inequality, or believe that 
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allocation of the good if it cannot be distributed to all who are 
qualified. 
I want to set aside an issue I have discussed at some length in the past.  
Even if all people who do not receive a good or an equal lottery chance 
at a good are discrimination victims, we might only give legal protection 
to plaintiffs from historically subordinated groups who face discrimination 
thus defined.  It follows that a qualified black person rejected from a job 
has a cause of action; a straight white male rejected though equally 
qualified might not.53
“merely” irrational practices without adverse impact on groups will not ultimately frustrate 
any applicant’s longer-term prospects of being treated meritocratically because he should 
be able to find some equivalent job in another setting if he is merely facing a practice 
that is in error.  For a further discussion of the “administrative” point, see infra note 53. 
 53. Simply tracing the reasons we believe putative plaintiffs are injured helps us 
see why this is the case.  For instance, if the white applicant is rejected for idiosyncratic 
reasons (whether the idiosyncratic distaste a particular employer has for certain real but 
job-irrelevant traits, for example, his astrological sign or random error in assessing his 
actual virtues or an overworked personnel department never read certain parts of his 
file), we would expect that he would not even be deprived of the desired good.  Multi-
actor markets, without state intervention, are unlikely to generate systematic rejection of 
those who were idiosyncratically rejected; blacks are far more likely to face persistent 
devaluation whether we can satisfy ourselves that the particular employer rejected the 
black applicant because of race or not.  Moreover, rejected Capricorns are not likely to 
feel that the employer is reminding them of the more general social derogation of his 
talents, nor do we fear the creation of segregated communities if Capricorns do not get 
particular jobs that match their talents or get service at a particular establishment when 
they can pay for it.  What is trickier, for reasons that take little imagination to work 
through, is what to do about more patterned, but nonracialized, widespread market irrationalities 
that will likely correspond to class markers: should white males be protected against job-
irrelevant rejections based on “bad grammar” or tattoos? 
Still, one must acknowledge Ford’s view that to protect blacks from all job 
requirements that a court thinks mindless not only has the problems I discuss in the 
text—that courts may not know what really is and is not properly job-relevant—but 
gives more protection than we need to avoid personal stigma and social castes.  So long 
as blacks face job requirements with which they can comply (for example, stated dress 
codes that they might not comply with if they did not have to), no involuntary castes will 
be created.  I am skeptical, both because I think many of the job requirements will be too 
amorphous to comply with (most are implicit requirements about “attitude”) and because 
the possibility that employers in a race-divided world will keep shifting requirements, 
devaluing a moving set of targets grounded in their perception of whatever the current 
manifestation of nonassimilated black culture is, makes it unavoidable that blacks will 
get the standard message associated with categorical group racism: whatever you are (in 
the dominant group’s perception) is precisely what is no good. 
It is worth noting that I am not clear whether an applicant who is rejected because of 
“random error” in assessing her actual qualifications (rather than distaste for a correctly 
perceived but irrelevant trait) is a victim of discrimination in this sense, because she 
might be described as someone who in fact had an appropriate lottery chance at getting 




I also want to set aside another significant issue I have discussed on 
several occasions.  It is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain when someone 
has met “reasonable prerequisites” for a job, though it is ordinarily more 
transparent when customers have met the far thinner qualifications to be 
served by a public accommodations owner.54  This is true not merely in a 
technical sense (given the difficulty in measuring output in group 
production situations) but also because the theoretical status of what are 
referred to as reaction qualifications55 is so difficult to ascertain.  What 
is most critical to note, however, is that one good way of exploring my 
intuition that the simple discrimination norm’s affirmative view (P is 
entitled to market-rational treatment) trumps the negative (P wins only if 
he failed to get something because of a bad reason) is to think about 
how easy the “trait discrimination” cases become when “qualifications” 
are actually readily established.  Whenever there is a strong and easily 
defined affirmative entitlement (for example, customers able to pay and 
behave nondisruptively deserve service at a restaurant), we see quickly 
that the canonical antidiscrimination norm is not really negative but 
affirmative (you must be inclusive to people with X traits).  Thus, while 
it may be a difficult employment law case when an employer excludes 
only “black English” speaking blacks, it is an easy public accommodations 
case that he cannot exclude “black English” speakers.  This is true solely 
because we know that speech is an irrelevant virtue for customers but 
not for workers, not because we are more certain that the public 
accommodation owner is “really” a “racist” rather than some sort of 
speech purist. 
While the norm forbidding employer discrimination directly regulates 
employers only, I have argued that it normatively extends to workers’ 
“true employers,” or the customers for whom the people who hire 
workers should be understood to serve merely as agents.56  Thus, the 
the job.  Maybe the problem is simply a procedural or burden-of-proof problem: should 
we make the employer prove that the qualified, rejected applicant was merely misassessed in 
some random way?  Moreover, the compliance costs of forcing defendants to correct 
“random error” are enormously high, whether they are borne before (in a more exacting 
screening process) or after the fact (in defending or revisiting negative hiring decisions).  
The high costs seem especially unreasonable because plaintiffs gain so little: there is no 
reason to believe any particular plaintiff will even be deprived of a good he seeks over a 
relevant time period when his qualifications are merely randomly misperceived. 
 54. “Eligibility” for housing is probably an intermediate case, modestly closer to 
the public accommodations case. 
 55. See Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99, 
99-100 (1983) (defining as “reaction qualifications” those qualifications that depend on 
how a customer or coworker relates to the employee, and asserting that reaction 
qualifications are crucial to a wide spectrum of jobs). 
 56. In the vast bulk of cases in which Jolls and Stein claim that the 
antidiscrimination norm forces employers to bear real social costs—like Bagenstos, they 
often use the term sacrifice profits though those contrasting the accommodation and 
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reason that an employer cannot refuse to hire a black or woman merely 
because his customer base prefers to deal with men or whites is that 
doing so would permit the “true employers” to refuse to do business with 
the applicant, even though the applicant had the valid prerequisites to 
perform the functions the customer legitimately sought.  What I have 
emphasized in the past is that if the customer is implicitly regulated by 
an antidiscrimination regime that explicitly governs the employer, and if 
the antidiscrimination norm forbids refusing to deal with those who are 
qualified, then we need to determine when a customer’s adverse reactions 
bespeak the worker’s lack of qualifications and when they bespeak this 
form of discrimination.57  We know that restaurant customers are entitled 
to insist that waiters promptly bring the right food.  The tougher question is 
whether they may also legitimately value obsequiousness, conventional 
stuffy manners, and physical attractiveness, even if doing so has a disparate 
impact on protected group members.58
What I want to focus more on are situations in which customers 
directly devalue status, rather than traits which have disparate impacts 
on distinct protected status groups.  I do so because it calls into question 
the claim that rules requiring employers to ignore customer preferences 
actually extend the antidiscrimination regime to customers.  That question, 
of course, is closely tied to one of this conference’s themes: whether 
antidiscrimination norms are interested in the distinct forms of costs that must be borne 
in integrating an establishment, not the profits earned by any given putative defendant—
lost revenues that arise from bigoted customer preferences are at stake.  Most others are 
either administrative costs, information costs, or transitional costs.  Each cost would 
disappear in a world in which the putative plaintiff’s true economic traits were known, in 
which there would been no prior history of discrimination, or in which the putative 
defendant sought to comply with the demands of the antidiscrimination regime.  This is 
not true for a putative plaintiff in an accommodation case, so to the degree that part of 
what injures a putative plaintiff about discrimination is the sense that his own personal 
economic virtues are ignored, the accommodation case plaintiff will be less injured.  See 
Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 848-50 (emphasizing cases of statistical discrimination in 
which no individual known to be as productive as a member of the favored group is 
excluded); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
642, 686 (2001) (customer preference cases); Stein, supra note 16, at 620-22 (citing 
customer preference cases and cases of statistical discrimination that raise issues of 
imperfect individualized information). 
 57. That is, refusal to deal despite the presence of qualifications. 
 58. The demand for obsequiousness might have disparate impact on blacks, for 
instance, given the possibility of black resistance to reenacting obsequious social scripts 
that have long, ugly racial histories.  The demand for “attractiveness” may have an 
adverse impact on older workers or workers with disabilities given prevailing norms of 
beauty (whatever the source of these norms). 




people have the right to engage in what most would concede is 
discrimination. 
I have three stylized cases in mind.  In the first case, female patients at 
a medical clinic substantially prefer to use female OB/GYNs.  In case 
two, white patients at a clinic with a predominantly white client base 
prefer to use white and Asian doctors because they believe, for conventionally 
racist “reasons,” that blacks and Latinos are less competent.59  In case 
three, the white patients at the same clinic strongly believe that 
standardized test scores are the best measures of aptitude, and further 
believe that affirmative action programs have led to an atypically high 
proportion of blacks and Latinos with low test scores getting medical 
degrees.  These white patients are thus wary of going to non-white, non-
Asian doctors. 
Now, imagine four stylized legal responses: (a) The employer (the 
clinic) need not hire applicants that patients are reluctant to see, 
regardless of the patients’ reluctance; (b) The employer must hire any 
applicant, regardless of customer preferences, so long as that applicant 
has the same job qualifications as the other doctors hired.  However, the 
employer need not direct patients to doctors they do not want to see, and 
a doctor’s pay may be tied to how many patients she serves; (c) The 
employer must hire all equally nonreaction qualified candidates.  It 
cannot direct patients to see doctors they are reluctant to see, but it must 
establish a pay scheme that is either divorced from patient service levels 
or adjusts for “illegitimate patient refusals to deal”;60 or (d) Not only 
 59. Other equally racist reasons include discrimination because the patients are 
averse to seeing blacks or Latinos in positions of obvious authority, or because they are 
averse to being touched by black and Latinos, believing them to be of some “lower 
station” in life. 
 60. I recognize, but essentially set aside, how difficult it would be to administer a 
legal rule that purported to squash commission systems when and only when distinctions 
in the commissions earned by different social groups were a function of customer 
prejudice.  There are two obvious and enormous administrative problems.  First, even if the 
court could recognize that commission-based pay disparities between groups were solely 
a function of customer bigotry, the remedies (either forbidding commission-based 
systems or mandating bonuses for members of the historically subordinated group) are 
intrusive.  Second, fact-finding would be extremely difficult: disentangling the degree to 
which, say, women failed as salespeople because of prejudice rather than competence or 
effectively focused effort at a job with an inexactly defined skill-set would be no easy 
task. 
It is clear that commission-driven pay differences between protected and nonprotected 
group members are currently valid.  See, e.g., Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., 852 F. 
Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994) (upholding a compensation system based on quantity or quality 
of work).  It is also worth noting that empirical evidence suggests customers may treat 
blacks and whites who deliver services differently: for instance, black cab drivers appear 
to receive lower tips from customers of all races.  See Ian Ayres et al., To Insure 
Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1627 (2005) 
(providing statistics which explore the difference in tipping of drivers of different races). 
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must the clinic hire and provide equal pay to those with the same 
nonreaction qualifications, but where possible the clinic must assign patients 
to qualified doctors regardless of patient preferences.  Obviously, the clinic 
cannot force patients go to the doctor, but it can be legally required to 
impose significant search and waiting costs on patients with certain 
racist reactions.  Obviously, we would not demand that clinics take this 
last step unless we believed that the antidiscrimination norm covered 
patients to some extent. 
The loose utilitarian will ask certain questions about these hypothetical 
cases and remedies.  First, even if we believe that the antidiscrimination 
norm fully extends to customers, why differentiate among these purely 
status-oriented, reaction qualifications?  For instance, what is driving the 
shared intuition that women seeking female gynecologists are behaving 
the most permissibly, that those who think blacks and Latinos are 
categorically unqualified are behaving least permissibly, and that those 
who engage in race-based statistical discrimination with certain forms of 
job quality indicators are intermediate cases?61  The woman seeking a 
female gynecologist plainly violates the antidiscrimination norm (though 
perhaps justifiably) if the norm is defined in terms of gender-conscious 
decisionmaking.62  However, she less plainly violates the norm if we 
think that male doctors are entitled only to jobs for which they are qualified 
and that femaleness is a permissible reaction-qualification for the job.63  
Or, we may believe that the judgment about whether female patients 
may choose female gynecologists always instantiates judgments about 
how allowing and forbidding her to make that decision impacts putative 
plaintiffs, putative defendants, and third parties. 
Second, even if we believe that the customer’s reactions are most 
plainly unacceptable (for example, pure status-oriented racism of the 
“blacks are not competent” or “don’t want to be touched by a black doctor” 
form), we may believe either that the customers’ interests in nonassociation 
are strong enough that we will do little to induce unwanted association 
 61. Readers most skeptical of the validity of tests will think them close to the 
status-oriented racists; those most favorable to standardized tests will think the behavior 
more benign. 
 62. Though once more, it might be worth noting the “trait-based” reinterpretation: 
she is not interested in a woman doctor, she is interested in a same-sex doctor in order to 
avoid a certain sort of privacy intrusion, and all such doctors happen to be women. 
 63. For example, in the same way that it would be plainly treated as a qualification 
for an acting job in which one must play a female character. 




or that the putative plaintiffs’ interests are adequately vindicated by 
remedies directed only at the employer.64
Any judgment that female patients should be entitled to select female 
gynecologists is nothing more than the vector function of the relevant 
interests.  On one hand, even a preference-laundering utilitarian believes 
that the putative defendants’ privacy gains and the increase in which 
they will effectively disclose medical problems are substantial.  At the 
same time, the possible effective exclusion of all men from doing 
OB/GYN work would likely have only modest impact on those who lost 
an opportunity (given the capacity to substitute other subspecialties), 
little impact on men’s general capacity to fill socially powerful roles in a 
fashion that would threaten the capacity of men to maintain adequate 
social standing, and little stigmatic impact either on the rejected individual 
doctors or on men who learn of the rejection.  The most stigmatic 
interpretation of the rejection—that either the particular rejected doctor 
or men generally are sex-obsessed creeps who treat even gynecological 
exams as occasions to sexualize an interaction—is likely counterbalanced 
by less stigmatic interpretations that the women simply seek privacy and 
conventional modesty.65  Obviously, one could treat the female patients’ 
associational “rights” as even stronger: we could either believe that the 
customer’s right to discriminate (even if based on the purer forms of 
sexism or racism) is absolute, or believe that it is absolute so long as the 
defendant has some good reason to engage in what would otherwise be 
seen as discrimination under two definitions (differentiation, decision 
because of gender).  However, in either case we would ignore whether or 
not the putative plaintiff is especially injured by the decision. 
 64. It is an interesting question, which I will largely set aside, whether an 
employer-focused remedy directing equal pay regardless of customer service really 
permits customers to continue to act on illegitimate preferences.  Even if the legal regime 
does not order that the clinic make it difficult for clients to manifest race or gender 
preferences, the clinic will surely be given strong incentives to do so if it must pay 
doctors with few patients as much as it pays those with many patients. 
 65. Compare this to a case in which the male clinic patients refused to see women 
physicians, so long as the physician would make any contact with their bodies or see 
them undressed.  Unless women patients had a symmetrical aversion to all male doctors, 
this taste would interfere both with individual female doctors’ desires to get a job of a 
certain broad form and, given the social esteem in which the job is generally held, would 
interfere with women achieving “caste” equality with men.  Moreover, it is hard to know 
whether the hypothesized male preference is stigmatizing or not, both because 
ascertaining whether it is motivated by something more akin to modesty or by distrust of 
women’s competence or distaste for women in positions of authority is difficult and 
because, even if motivated by distaste for physical exams from women, it is hard to 
know whether one can disentangle this preference from two plainly stigmatizing beliefs, 
namely that women are unclean and even if women are technically competent doctors, 
women’s touch should be reserved for sexual situations given women’s normatively 
predominant sexual role. 
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The argument for treating the customer’s associational right as more 
absolute, that is, without regard to the impact on the plaintiff, could be 
grounded in deontological theory, but it could also rise from the idea that 
putative plaintiffs get adequate relief if the institutional actor—the clinic 
employer in this case—ignores individual customer preferences when 
making hiring and perhaps pay decisions.66  The theory that they get 
enough so long as they get the job title and money plainly emphasizes 
certain aspects of the antidiscrimination regime.  These are the aspects 
that emphasize the individual plaintiff’s access to a desired good and to 
some degree his and the group’s access to immediately visible aspects of 
social prestige and status.  However, this theory put little emphasis on 
other aspects such as freedom from derogatory communication and 
access to the aspects of status less associated with material rewards.  So, 
the black doctors who idly sit at the clinic, drawing a check while the 
white patients refuse to see them, are hardly freed from degrading 
communications.  Blacks, as a group, continue to live in a world in which 
such degrading beliefs maintain an undue measure of social respectability. 
What about the possibility that the customer’s right is absolute, not 
because plaintiff claims are adequately vindicated if we regulate the 
employer, but because customers, unlike business owners, should simply 
be free to do business with whom they choose?  The best argument for 
this position finds common ground with arguments against utilitarianism 
generally, narrowed to view the arguments as persuasive accounts why 
we should limit the domain in which we think utility-maximization is a 
proper decision rule.  Here is a narrow reading of the attack on the 
utilitarian preference for universal agent neutrality: although it may be 
appropriate for a public official to choose to invest in equal-cost 
infrastructure that saves two lives rather than one, a mother need not 
save two kids who fell out of a boat at the expense of her own drowning 
child.  As a mother, she is entitled to take her own positional, agent-
relative interests seriously.  We legally instantiate this intuition by 
 66. As I have noted, if the employer must not only hire underutilized male 
gynecologists but pay them commensurate with fully-booked female gynecologists, the 
legal regime will almost surely interfere with the factual capacity of women to choose 
female gynecologists since the clinic will, to avoid financial losses, make it difficult for 
patients to select their doctors.  I also noted that while there is substantial legal authority 
that the clinic cannot use certain customer preferences to justify failures to hire (though it 
may use customer preferences for bodily privacy or unadorned sexual titillation), there is 
no authority that it cannot establish pay schemes, like commissions, that differentiate pay 
based on customer preferences. 




saying that she has a right to free action when it comes to saving her kid.  
As such, many of the classic deontological “rights” meant to be good 
against social welfare claims can be seen as protecting the legitimate 
preference for a partial viewpoint, a viewpoint that treats the intense 
interest in and preference for one’s own life and the life of those with 
whom one has special relationships as legitimate. 
In a related fashion, regulating the employment market may be done 
using the same welfare-maximizing “principles” used in allocating safety 
infrastructure expenditures.  However, imposing a decision rule on 
individuals that requires them to maximize welfare (assuming that the 
rejected black doctor, and blacks more generally, will gain more than the 
patient loses if the patient is “forced” to be treated by a competent 
person, though racism prevents her from acknowledging such competence) 
is to deny them the capacity to treat their own sense of comfort and 
confidence as primary.  Put differently, this denies them appropriate partiality. 
Though of clear weight, I ultimately find the argument unpersuasive 
though I will not detail why here.67  However, it is worth noting that if 
we think of agent-relativity as appropriate in particular restricted domains, 
that (a) utilitarians can offer plausible second-order rule-utilitarian 
explanations of why it is bad for each actor to act as a utilitarian 
calculator on particular occasions; and (b) that convincing pleas for 
agent-relativity all involve agent-relative preferences we wish to 
encourage (strong attachment to one’s children) rather than those we 
discourage (irrationally devaluing black doctors’ competence).  There 
may be contingent welfarist arguments that we should not pressure 
people to deal with doctors they do not want to deal with—assuming the 
reluctance is actually recalcitrant and people will forego highly valuable 
medical care—but they are not arguments that question whether 
customers are in fact obliged to allocate the relevant good (their 
patronage) to all those possessing requisite qualifications, especially 
when their illegitimate judgments about job quality have an adverse 
impact. 
 67. If the argument is at least partly correct, then Bagenstos is correct that the 
employer’s associational interests are just as powerful as the customer’s associational 
interests.  See Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 881-82 (arguing that libertarian interests in 
free association are strong).  However, what this suggests is not what he thinks it does—
that the conventional civil rights regime requires sacrifices from putative defendants no 
different from those required of defendants asked to accommodate—but that in each 
case, a civil rights regime should tailor its remedy to account for the distinct interests of 
all affected by a particular rule.  Thus, the fact that every imaginable sort of defendant 
has “an interest” in free action does not mean they have the same interest or as strong an 
interest.  If, for instance, we think the customers’ associational interests radically exceed 
those of “the clinic,” then we might try to protect customers from limitations on their 
choice of doctors, while protecting (some of) the plaintiffs’ interests by protecting them 
from commission-based pay schemes. 
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To the extent that we identify discrimination’s chief harms as failure-
to-satisfy-the-qualified in terms of its stigmatic impact on individuals 
and in terms of constructing social caste, we must immediately wonder 
whether there is any reason to distinguish the conventional antidiscrimination 
norm from an accommodation norm.  Certainly, it would be possible to 
define the accommodation norm so as to demand lottery distribution of 
jobs and goods.68  Obviously, though, the accommodation norm’s ordinary 
articulation (mandating only reasonable accommodations of those 
applicants who are qualified if accommodated) suggests both narrower 
obligations and a narrower conception of the problems antidiscrimination 
law is meant to address. 
4.  A person discriminates by refusing to accommodate (at no 
charge) an employee or potential employee if the employee’s gross 
output (but not her output net of accommodation costs) is equal to that 
of nonaccommodated employees (or discriminates against a 
customer if he will not serve the customer at conventional market 
prices when all that differentiates the customer from other 
customers is the higher cost of serving her that results not from her 
“tastes” for distinct goods or services but from her status-based 
“needs”). 
There is a debate I will only advert to briefly about whether 
accommodation norms can be distinguished from either of the prior two 
antidiscrimination norms.  The debate is somewhat ambiguous; three of 
the most renowned legal academic advocates who suggest that the norms 
are fundamentally indistinguishable (Stein,69 Bagenstos,70 and Jolls71) 
move, at times imprecisely, between the claim that there are no interesting 
descriptive distinctions between situations that call for accommodation 
and those in which the plaintiff will be included if not faced with 
conventional discrimination and the claim that although the demands are 
descriptively distinguishable, they are of equal, and fundamentally 
indistinguishable, normative force.  Then, assuming that the accommodation 
norm demands that defendants take factually distinct steps from the steps 
 68. For example, an employer could be said to be asked to do no more than 
accommodate an “unqualified” applicant by giving her an aide that effectively did his 
job, or paying him without regard to his contributions to firm profitability. 
 69. Stein, supra note 16. 
 70. Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 830. 
 71. Jolls, supra note 56, at 686. 




they take if governed only by the antidiscrimination norm’s theory two 
or three, I will briefly investigate what harms plaintiffs facing (conventional) 
discrimination face which nonaccommodated plaintiffs do not.  Further, I 
investigate what legitimate interests defendants have in resisting 
accommodation demands that those resisting demands to stop simple 
discrimination do not have.  I will then discuss the common harms and 
sources of defendant resistance. 
Those of us who believe that the second and third antidiscrimination 
norms differ from the accommodation norm highlight several analytical 
distinctions and make descriptive predictions based on these analytical 
distinctions.72  Fundamentally, what distinguishes the putative 
antidiscrimination defendant from the putative accommodation defendant is 
that the accommodation defendant’s private attitudes and beliefs are 
fundamentally irrelevant to the costs of accommodation while these 
attitudes are essentially all that is relevant in any truly pure 
antidiscrimination case.  The plaintiff-defendant dyad is crucial in an 
antidiscrimination suit; it is relevant in a true accommodation suit only 
to the degree that we believe that the defendant has atypical expertise in 
supplying accommodations.73  Secondarily, the cases are distinguishable 
to the degree that one adopts a modernist rather than strongly postmodernist 
view of the constraints on social institutions.  To the extent one sides 
with hyper-postmodernists that all constraints are socially constructed in 
the relevant sense—what drives the relative difficulty of accomplishing 
two ends is merely the social actor’s willingness to accomplish it in only 
one particular way, and the decision to favor one resolution is largely a 
function of the social power of those favored by one resolution—one 
believes that all accommodation costs are a function of a decision to 
organize production or distribution of goods in a fashion that makes it 
 72. In order to take on what he thinks of as the harder challenge, Bagenstos 
identifies what I refer to as simple discrimination with the second (“because of 
disability”) norm.  See Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 833-36.  However, I have always 
plainly stated that defendants be subject to a more demanding requirement, encapsulated 
in the third version of the norm, that they cannot exclude a person with a disability 
unless it is “capitalistically, impersonally rational” to do so.  This leaves no room for the 
use of facially neutral, but economically nonprobative non-job-related qualifications that 
victimize members of all “outsider” groups.  Thus, in my view, job applicants with 
dyslexia cannot be legitimately excluded by a nonpredictive reading requirement or by 
nonpredictive job tests, without regard to whether the requirements are proxy covers for 
ontological discrimination. 
 73. And, even then, the question of whether it is reasonable for the “expert” 
defendant to pay for an accommodation whose cost is not attributable to anything special 
about the defendant remains a difficult issue.  This is so unless one believes, as I do, that 
compensating the defendant interferes with his incentives to accommodate in the most 
cost-effective fashion. 
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more costly to employ or serve “outsiders.”  The modernist view is that 
this is simply wrong-headed Utopian romanticism. 
Although it is plausible that more inclusive equal-cost production 
methods could become available,74 it is also contingently plausible that 
this is not the case, or not the case in any time-frame relevant to 
decisionmakers who should instead treat the costs as fixed.75  Maybe 
 74. This contingent possibility is extremely significant in the actual practice of 
overcoming the exclusion of people with disabilities.  Here is how I put this point in 
Market Discrimination and Groups: 
It is clearly one of the real achievements of the disability rights advocacy 
movement to demonstrate repeatedly that the failure to grant accommodations 
is in fact a form of simple discrimination because the accommodations are not 
in fact nearly so costly as bigoted or ignorant employers believe they will be.  
More generally, civil rights groups will invariably note the degree to which 
socially powerful actors mistake difference for inferiority. 
   . . . . 
   . . . [Moreover,] [a] person may be less productive (in the employment 
context) or costlier to serve (in the public accommodation context), given the 
defendant’s current mode of organization.  If, though, the defendant is forced 
by legal fiat to employ the worker or serve the customer, it might have the 
capacity to reorganize in such a way that net product or net receipts equalize. 
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, supra note 20, at 877 n.71. 
 75. Stein, alone among the critics of the antidiscrimination-accommodation distinction, 
plainly recognizes this point, though his view that the failure to engage in a “reasonable” 
accommodation cannot be meaningfully differentiated from a failure to engage in a 
wholly costless one seems transparently analytically unsound.  See Stein, supra note 16, 
at 602, 641.  Stein, though, also gives much more explicit positive attention to what I am 
describing as the postmodernist view associated with the “social model of disability” 
proffered by the “disability studies movement.”  See id. at 599-602, 640-45. 
Bagenstos is more ambiguous.  There are plainly points at which he states that there 
are “real costs” associated with accommodation, and that his only point is that the refusal 
to bear these costs is not normatively distinguishable (at either the level of wholly 
individualized morality or, more relevant, in terms of an individual morality whose 
contours are dictated by an awareness of the social consequences of conduct) from the 
refusal to stop engaging in classic discrimination.  See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 
830, 836, 869-70.  At other times, he falls into the “postmodernist trap,” failing to make 
or notice descriptive distinctions in the mechanisms that lead to exclusion, most 
importantly by ignoring the significance to the plaintiff of the defendant’s identity and 
tastes.  For example, Bagenstos states that “[t]he employer [in an accommodation case] 
is the only party in a position to dismantle the structure of occupational 
segregation . . . .”  Id. at 870.  The statement—true of a discriminating employer—is 
patently untrue of a nonaccommodating employer unless (a) that employer has unique 
expertise in constructing appropriate accommodations, like retrofits that increase access 
for mobility-impaired customers; and (b) the employer will waste social resources 
constructing these if compensated to do so.  I believe that these conditions sometimes 
obtain and justify uncompensated accommodation requirements, but the notion that 
one can assume that they always obtain them, as a logically entailed feature of 
nonaccommodating putative defendants, is indefensible. 




dyslexics can do some subset of reading-heavy jobs as effectively as 
nondyslexics, at the same cost, if we decrease the amount of reading in 
the job or use text-to-voice software to assist slow readers; maybe not.  
In digging ditches, maybe people with bad backs can compete with those 
with healthy backs because digging machinery is cheap enough to 
compete with manual labor; maybe not.  Maybe there are reliable substitutes 
for visual inspection that would permit blind workers to perform all 
inspection tasks as cheaply as sighted inspectors; but maybe not.76  The 
predictive lesson, of course, is that all things equal, free entry and 
competition will tend to undermine simple discrimination while it will 
tend to make efforts by a subset of employers to accommodate unstable.  
Globalization and unregulated competition would make any single 
nation’s mandated accommodation regime less stable unless others 
adopted the regime, just as it would make the private imposition of 
simple discrimination more difficult. 
It might be easiest to think about “dyads” and “social construction” by 
moving outside antidiscrimination theory and thinking instead about 
problems of “coercion.”  Imagine three situations involving young 
competitive swimmers and their relationships with their coaches.  In all 
cases, the swimmers would like to skip predawn practices.  But in each 
of the three cases, the coaches tell them that they can only choose 
between choices (2) and (3), though each would prefer (1). 
Case One.  Fast Swimmer: Her preference order is: (1) Swim 
faster + no early practices.  (2) Swim faster + early morning practices.  
(3) No early morning practices, no improvement in her times. 
 76. I confess it is possible that I first came to the view that antidiscrimination and 
accommodation norms were plainly distinct in the special education context, a context in 
which advocates for dyslexic pupils did not really urge an equal-cost reorganization of 
education or social reordering that would minimize the significance of reading skills.  
Rather, what the advocates sought was smaller classes taught by more trained teachers 
that would permit dyslexic students to gain reading skills.  No one questioned that this 
involved the choice to use more resources, otherwise readily transferable to other pupils, 
for the subset of disabled students.  Similarly, advocates for blind students did not claim 
it was as cheap to communicate the details of complex diagrams (for example, body 
parts in anatomy texts) through description by paid readers as it is to communicate them 
with drawings to sighted persons; moreover, the claim was not that drawings gained 
currency simply because a world dominated by sighted persons had used the method that 
benefited the sighted.  In my view, it is a proper use of resources to permit a blind 
student to get the information in the anatomy diagram if he is able to absorb it, but the 
idea that it merely “appears” to cost resources because we assumed a world of sighted 
persons is baseless.  The demands were plainly and unambiguously thought to differ 
(factually, if not necessarily in moral force) from a demand to stop excluding disabled 
students from mainstreamed classes because of the distaste of teachers or other pupils.  
Further, noting that even a regime that merely insisted on forbidding distaste-based 
exclusion would also be resource costly (for example, because of administrative enforcement, 
information, or transitional costs) would not make the underlying distinctions disappear. 
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Case Two.  Fastest Swimmer: Her preference order is: (1) Win 
races + no early practices.  (2) Win races + early morning practices.  
(3) No early morning practices, lose races. 
Case Three.  Please the Coach Swimmer: (1) Keep her coach + no 
early practices.  (2) Keep her coach + early practices (the coach 
disrespects swimmers unwilling to get up early to swim because 
they do not seem to care enough about the sport, or about pleasing 
him).  (3) No early practices, lose her coach. 
What is crucial to note is that in determining whether she “must” go to 
predawn practices, neither swimmer in case one or two is in a 
significantly dyadic relationship with her coach.  In each case, she may 
well feel constrained and unable to get what she most wants, but the 
coach is doing nothing but informing her of a constraint he does not 
control.  Cases one and two differ in the sense that needing to practice at 
ungodly early times to win races is to a greater degree socially 
constructed.  That is, if no swimmers practiced so much, she could 
possibly beat the other, moderate-practice swimmers.77  Note that the 
coach plays no interesting role in either case.  Compare this to the third 
case, where the swimmer’s beef is with the coach (and where we 
traditionally begin to think some about problems of “coercion” as well 
as problems of constraint):78 The coach is not only the main source of 
her disempowerment,79 but his judgmental statements are potentially 
wounding (for example, she is lazy or undevoted).80  The parallels to the 
 77. It is important to remember also that the fact that her “need” to practice early is 
socially constructed and contingent does not make it bad.  It may or may not be a good 
thing that the young must trade off sleep for competitive swimming success; however, it 
is plainly not inevitable.  I think that those of us with a modernist disposition believe that 
the connection between swimming faster and practicing more is not a contingent one. 
 78. I am suspicious that it is useful to think about the problem of coercion separate 
from the problem of constraint and power, because an undue focus on coercion’s special 
problems misleads us into ignoring remediable problems of undue constraint whenever 
the constraining party has no independent legal or moral duty to undo the constraint.  I 
discuss problems of coercion at some length in Mark Kelman, Thinking About Sexual 
Consent, 58 STAN. L. REV. 935, 964-71 (2005). 
 79. He could lose his power as well if he is costlessly replaceable by other coaches 
with distinct preferences about swimmer behavior (just as a racist employer would do 
nothing of economic consequence to rejected black applicants if each employer were 
perfectly, costlessly replaceable). 
 80. It is an interesting question whether the putative plaintiff is injured when 
coerced (or subject to discriminatory preferences) simply by the forced reminder that 
power hierarchies exist.  That the coach’s preferences determine her options is a brutal 
reminder that he enjoys power over her; the fact that one must swim early to swim fast 




accommodation cases are rather transparent.  Of course, we would most 
prefer to sacrifice no output when we hire a disabled worker who 
requires accommodation, but if the employer tells us that we cannot have 
what we most prefer, he is nothing but a messenger.81  But if he refuses 
to deal with disabled workers or patrons, he bears an atypical relationship to 
the frustration of both the disabled plaintiff’s desires and our desire to 
insure social exclusion without economic sacrifice.  If the employer 
shifts or restrains his preferences, or if he s replaced by a different, less 
bigoted employer, the disabled plaintiff is no longer socially excluded.  
Moreover, his desires communicate all the nasty messages we do not 
wish the plaintiff to hear. 
Of course, there remains a “contested” bad message whenever a 
putative defendant refuses to accommodate: that the employer and a 
“society” that refuses to order accommodation does not value the 
tells her nothing about her place in the social power hierarchy.  The accommodation-
discrimination parallel is fairly obvious: the discriminating employer’s refusal to deal 
because of his preferences enacts his relative social power while the nonaccommodator 
is merely a medium for the message that cheaper and more expensive ways to produce 
the widgets exist. 
 81. The fact that he bears no special responsibility for our inability to get our 
fondest wish does not mean that we will not impose on him a legal obligation to get us to 
our next best preferred position. (Our next most preferred position may often be that we 
sacrifice some goods that the particular defendant might otherwise be able to produce in 
exchange for higher levels of social inclusion for workers with disabilities.)  In MARK 
KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? 8, 126 (1999), I argued that we may sometimes 
impose an accommodation duty on a particular private defendant, even though we think 
she bears no special moral responsibility for the plaintiff’s exclusion.  This is so because 
she will deliver accommodation services more cheaply than any other provider could, 
but only if she is forced to provide them without being compensated for their cost.  A 
vital observation flows from this view of why we impose an accommodation duty on 
private defendants who did not create the need to accommodate.  Whatever one makes of 
my argument that the duty not to engage in discrimination because of status or to fail to 
allocate goods to which people are entitled applies to individual customers, the duty to 
accommodate almost certainly does not.  If an employer refused to hire an applicant 
because it would cost the employer’s customers more to deal with the applicant, they 
could plainly do so (though they might be bound to eliminate those costs at the 
institutional level).  In my view, this is not because the duty to discriminate does not run 
to customers, but because the duty to accommodate is not coextensive with the duty not 
to discriminate.  Think back to the medical clinic case: the clinic might be obliged to 
provide a sign interpreter that would permit a deaf doctor to communicate with her 
patients, but even if we think we should do what we can to impel patients to go to the 
deaf doctor if communication is facilitated, the patients would and should not be 
required to pay more to provide a sign interpreter. 
However, I can think of almost no situations in which we would not want the 
discriminating defendant to provide inclusion.  First, it is not only invariably cheapest for 
her to shift her preferences without compensation (if we pay people to restrain their 
racism or disability-phobias, they will falsely claim bad attitudes or, worse, develop 
them).  Second, we have preference-laundering reasons to discount the defendant’s 
gains.  And, finally, what we return to discuss in the text is that the pure discriminator 
gives worse messages and interferes to a greater extent with the plaintiff’s most 
legitimate desires to be treated justly. 
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excluded plaintiff’s inclusion as much as it values the foregone goods.  
Equally obvious, we do value whatever the standard discrimination 
case’s plaintiff gains from inclusion over whatever psychic income the 
discriminator gets from discriminating.  Because “goods” have value 
only because they generate “psychic income,” the cases could never be 
utterly conceptually distinct.82
However, conceptual distinctions may be doing little work if we are 
trying to distinguish among putative plaintiffs’ injuries or putative 
defendants’ legitimate interests.  I have already briefly adverted to the 
reasons that the discriminator’s interests may be less worthy of 
protection in discrimination cases by discussing how “loose utilitarianism” 
may blur into more classically deontological theories and will thus 
simply review these reasons hastily.  First, we may disbelieve claims or 
have trouble distinguishing true from false claims when defendants 
claim that they have been injured when forbidden to discriminate.  It is 
hard to know if discriminators really experience psychic loss from 
“forced association,” and if so, how much, while the losses accommodators 
experience from foregone production have readily measured market 
prices.  Second, we may believe as long-term utility-maximizers that we 
should discourage people from developing certain negative preferences 
because their development will lower aggregate social utility.83  A rule 
that allows public accommodations owners to exclude a patron, 
grounded in the idea that he genuinely finds the patron distasteful, 
empowers and encourages those with bigoted tastes.84  Finally, and most 
powerfully, there is the moralism of straight-out preference-laundering.85
 82. That last sentence probably represents a good quick summary of the overlap 
between my position and the position taken by Bagenstos.  See Bagenstos, supra note 16, 
passim. 
 83. For instance, envy may be a counter-utilitarian preference.  If each of us could 
be encouraged to gain utility when others consume, rather than see our own utility 
positions worsen, aggregate utility would rise. 
 84. There would be less perverse incentive to “develop” bigoted tastes if 
nonassociation rights, contingent on higher levels of distaste, were not capable of being 
waived.  If they can be waived, of course, “fake” bigots will charge those who face their 
fake bigotry to waive exclusion rights. 
 85. These borderline utilitarian/deontological arguments seem entirely consistent 
with the arguments made on the distinction between unprotected spite fences and fences 
built with some other consumption purpose.  If we are deciding whether a fence is a 
nuisance (using something like a Learned Hand cost-benefit formula), we may despair 
that we can calculate the true intrapsychic gains that annoying one’s neighbor really 
brings, while a fence used to muffle sound or block light may increase the (easily 
observed) market value of the fence owner’s property.  Moreover, if spite fence owners 




Considering the distinct ways in which “discrimination” and 
“nonaccommodation” injures putative plaintiffs is more interesting.  
Obviously, many of the injuries are the same.  This is true not only in the 
most trivial sense that each putative plaintiff does not get something he 
desires, but in the far more relevant sense that the widespread prevalence 
of either traditional discrimination or nonaccommodation leads to a 
highly segregated, hierarchical society.  Groups will not only be separate, 
but it will be clear that some groups occupy less esteemed positions.86
The difference revolves around the questions of how putative 
plaintiffs define merit, how they define irrationality and animus, and 
how they experience the distinctions between having desires frustrated 
for bad reasons only, for reasons that seem merely adequate, and for 
perfectly acceptable reasons.  At core, my suspicion is that the person 
seeking accommodation will recognize that the discriminator’s reluctance 
does not come from the bad reasons that drive the theory two 
discriminator or even the unacceptable reasons that drive the theory 
three discriminator.87  Instead, he and the accommodation resister share 
are protected (but can waive the right to construct the fence) only if they feel 
considerable spite, more people ought to develop considerable spite, though it is 
destructive of social welfare to do so.  And finally, most obviously moralistically, there 
seems to be little reason to protect people precisely because of their bad traits.  Rather, 
we want them to change, and if they are unwilling to change, we hardly feel like 
rewarding them for being who they are. 
Moralism may be even more transparently present when the putative defendant acts as 
a surrogate for a social planner, as he arguably does as an employer.  Employment 
markets may allocate resources to meet “socially legitimate” demands.  In this regard, 
think about a standard criminal justification case raising parallel issues, in which the 
putative defendant’s status as social representative is even more transparent: two 
defendants violate general laws against speeding or running red lights.  One claims 
justification because he is rushing a heart attack victim to the hospital, the other because 
he truly gets an enormous charge out of speeding, scaring others, making them reenact in 
real life the chase scenes he loves in the movies.  Now of course we may disbelieve the 
second would-be justifier’s claims that he gains as much hedonically as we all gain when 
a heart attack victim is rescued, and we may believe that to allow recklessness when one 
develops enough of a taste for it encourages a welfare-reducing set of tastes.  However, I 
think what is even more apparent is that the criminal defendant invoking a justification 
defense is not speaking on behalf of himself: his claim is that the legislature enacted a 
rule in generalities (it is usually a bad idea to speed and run lights), but that the general 
rule is inexorably inaccurate, by the legislature’s own lights.  The legislators want him to 
speed if he was carting the heart attack victim to emergency care: he invokes the defense 
because he is the immediate decisionmaker, not because his particular tastes are of any 
great moment. 
 86. I believe the accommodation norm, at core, is dominantly a norm designed to 
desegregate in the relevant fashion.  That is why, I argue, it is far harder to understand 
how an individual abstracted from a socially salient group identity could make a viable 
accommodation claim, though it is far easier to understand an antidiscrimination regime 
in which we had no knowledge of social groups or fear of castes.  This is the critical 
point in Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, supra note 20, at 834, 836-37. 
 87. See supra Part III. 
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similar preferences for tangible goods that neither prefers to sacrifice.  
At the same time, the nonaccommodated putative plaintiff will feel 
frustrated by the failure to recognize merit that he would not feel were 
he frustrated simply by his inability to do the job capably.  I think the 
standard intuitions on merit—as well as the associated feelings of injustice 
and injury that come when merit-based claims are breached—are 
complex in a market economy.  As I have long noted, I do not think 
there is absolute identity between one’s sense of relevant “skill” and 
one’s net marginal product.  Instead, people suppose their “talent” or 
“skill” is manifest in their gross output, ignoring distinctions in input 
costs, so long as the “special” inputs that they seek are not especially 
helpful to others.88
IV. CONCLUSION 
We are injured whenever we do not get the things we want, and 
further injured when we lose out in some way other than in a lottery 
distribution.  People who distribute the “goods” we want (for example, 
service at a store, jobs, companionship, whatever) have a variety of 
reasons to distribute to some people and not others.  Sometimes, we 
figure injuries may be high,89 but we think these injuries to plaintiffs are 
 88. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job 
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1991). 
What I suspect actually supports intuitions that there is a difference between 
output capacity and net-value-added capacity is the ill-defined sense that the 
worker actively produces output, while her added input costs are passively 
caused by her peculiar status; in the absence of activity there can be no merit.  
Alternatively, there may be a sense that the job from the employee’s 
perspective is to produce output; if the employee does that as well as the next 
person, she is as good as the next person at the task that has been set for her.  
Capital costs are somehow the concern of the employer.  If one sees merit as 
metaphorically measuring performance in a contest or race, employees with 
equal outputs seem, perhaps, to have “tied” in the race, as long as the added 
equipment that only one contestant requires does not bolster her capacity to run 
faster.  Contestants in a race are almost surely considered equal, even if one is 
wearing more expensive orthopedic shoes, as long as the expensive shoes 
would not have benefited all other contestants as well. 
Id.  For further discussions of when and why accommodations may be needed to permit a 
putative plaintiff to demonstrate her merit rather than being taken as a signal that she is 
less meritorious, ceteris paribus, than those who do not require accommodations, see 
MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 164-80 (1997). 
 89. For example, there may well be nothing more wounding at the individual level 
than being rejected for a really good reason, though rejections for good reasons will not 
create (though they might well re-create) social castes. 




outweighed because putative defendants typically have strong, legitimate 
interests in rejecting for good reasons.  Other times, injuries are substantial, 
and the gains to discriminators seem small.  This is particularly the case 
when the gains are measured by loose utilitarians suspicious of both 
atypical and malevolent preferences.90
One can see that injuries are fairly context sensitive.  Even the simple 
pain of being deprived of a wanted good (over time) may depend on 
whether the particular putative defendant has unique control over a 
resource or a relatively commonplace basis for rejecting the putative 
plaintiff’s wish.  Also, depending on the mode of discrimination, the 
stigmatic injuries both to the rejected plaintiff and to those who feel that 
they could have been in the plaintiff’s shoes differ subtly.  Core cases of 
racist animus and stereotyping create a distinct stigma from core cases of 
irrationality.  In turn, nonaccomodating defendants who compromise the 
plaintiffs’ sense that they have been treated in accord with “merit” or 
with sensitivity to their inclusion in civil society produce yet another sort 
of injury. 
I am skeptical that the second and third norms fundamentally cover 
“institutions” rather than individuals, and one can investigate that 
intuition by looking at whether it covers customers as well as employers.  
Individuals will often be free to discriminate, because we think the short-
term utility balance suggests that they should,91 and sometimes because 
we believe that the individual should be free from the stringent 
demands to act as an impersonal utilitarian calculator.  In the case of 
nonaccommodation, in which we wisely choose to make a social 
investment in desegregation and anticaste destigmatization, it would be 
rational if the polity generally funded the needed expenditures or if 
private institutions best suited to efficiently provide accommodation 
services funded them.  It is hard to imagine any situation in which 
isolated individuals, like customers, ought to bear accommodation costs. 
 90. Ultimately, I cannot overemphasize the degree to which the “welfarist” case 
for an antidiscrimination norm rests to a considerable extent on varieties of preference-
laundering, whether it is “pure,” grounded in the inability to ascertain the sincerity of 
claims of “outlier” tastes, or grounded in moral hazard arguments. 
 91. For example, it is just too hard to be married to someone you do not want, 
whatever the reason you rejected them. 
